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I. INTRODUCTION
By all accounts, the problem of equal employment opportunity for non-
traditional workers has morphed into a problem of equal employment quality.1
With respect to gender, women have made significant progress in accessing market
work but continue to lag behind men in such areas as job advancement, pay, and
consistent workforce participation.2  This type of "second-generation
discrimination"--or what I prefer to think of as second-generation exclusion-has
been attributed, at least in part, to women's disproportionate role in family
caregiving, coupled- with a combination of work norms and unconscious gender
stereotypes. 3 The standard way work is organized-in forty-plus-hour weeks with
no time off for childrearing or elder care-excludes many caregivers 4 (mostly
1 See, e.g., Tristin K. Green, Discrimination in Workplace Dynamics: Toward a
Structural Account of Disparate Treatment Theory, 38 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REv. 91, 91
(2003) ("As traditional social norms permitting overt racism and segregation give way to a
modem norm of egalitarianism.., discrimination often operates in the workplace today
less as a blanket policy or discrete, identifiable decision to exclude than as a perpetual tug
on opportunity and advancement."); Laura T. Kessler, The Attachment Gap: Employment
Discrimination Law, Women 's Cultural Caregiving, and the Limits of Economic and
Liberal Legal Theory, 34 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 371, 386-87 (2001) (describing an
"attachment gap" in the quality of women's and men's participation in market work in
terms of benefits, stability, duration, and opportunity for advancement); Susan Sturm,
Second Generation Employment Discrimination: A Structural Approach, 101 COLUM. L.
REv. 458, 465-69 (2001) (using the term "second generation discrimination" to refer to
disparities resulting from "patterns of interaction among groups within the workplace that,
over time, exclude nondominant groups" as opposed to "first generation discrimination"
claims which "revolved around deliberate exclusion or subordination based on race or
gender").
2 Many commentators have surveyed the statistics supporting this claim and explained
their relationship to women's caregiving. See, e.g., Erin L. Kelly, Discrimination Against
Caregivers? Gendered Family Responsibilities, Employer Practices, and Work Rewards, in
HANDBOOK OF EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION RESEARCH: RIGHTS AND REALITIES 353,
355-60 (Laura Beth Nielsen & Robert L. Nelson eds., 2005); Kessler, supra note 1, at 385-
86; Gillian Lester, A Defense of Paid Family Leave, 28 HARV. J.L. & GENDER 1, 20-25
(2005).
3 I consciously use the word "exclusion" rather than discrimination to separate these
manifestations of inequality from the historical use of the term "discrimination" which
supposed a conscious and intentional act of class-based animus. I do not disagree with
other scholars who have argued convincingly that second-generation exclusion can fit
within the legal definition and normative understanding of what discrimination means. See
Green, supra note 1, at 99; Melissa Hart, Subjective Decisionmaking and Unconscious
Discrimination, 56 ALA. L. REv. 741, 745 (2005). However, I think it important to use less
pejorative terminology in order to engender support from employers and the political
community.
4 1 will use the gender-neutral term "caregivers" throughout this Article, conscious of
the fact that the limitations posed by family caregiving fall on many, if not most, women
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women, but also some men) from positions for which they are otherwise qualified.5
At the same time, lingering perceptions of the fitness of mothers for certain types
of work, as well as societal expectations about fathers' role in family caregiving,
may impede caregivers of both genders in competing against traditional workers.6
This Article responds to these problems with a procedural prescription. It
advocates what I call an organizational justice approach to equal employment
quality, consisting of a set of judicially enforceable private due process rights
designed to enhance worker voice and provide incentives for voluntary employer
accommodation of caregiving. In so doing, it joins the work of a number of
advocates and scholars who have called for greater legal protection for working
caregivers.7 These thinkers have made significant strides both in focusing the
and some, but relatively few, men. At the same time I share the views of other
commentators that strategies for enabling men's increased participation in family are
integral to the project of achieving equal employment quality for women. See Martin H.
Malin, Fathers and Parental Leave Revisited, 19 N. ILL. U. L. REV. 25, 31-33 (1998)
(arguing that lack of paternal involvement in childcare promotes discrimination against
women and forces women to slow or interrupt their careers to tend to their children);
Michael Selmi, Family Leave and the Gender Wage Gap, 78 N.C. L. REV. 707, 708 (2000)
("[I]f there is to be greater equality for women in the workplace, it will be necessary for
men to change their behavior, both in and out of the workplace, before employers will
begin to change theirs.").
5 See JOAN C. WILLIAMS, UNBENDING GENDER: WHY FAMILY AND WORK CONFLICT
AND WHAT TO Do ABOUT IT 64-84, 113 (2000) (describing how market work is structured
around an ideal worker who has no household or caregiving responsibilities and who
receives a free flow of domestic work); Michelle A. Travis, Recapturing the
Transformative Potential of Employment Discrimination Law, 62 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 3,
11 (2005) (same).
6 See Susan Huhta et al., Looking Forward and Back.: Using the Pregnancy
Discrimination Act and Discriminatory Gender/Pregnancy Stereotyping to Challenge
Discrimination Against New Mothers, 7 EMP. RTS. & EMP. POL'Y J. 303, 317-18 (2003);
Joan C. Williams & Nancy Segal, Beyond the Maternal Wall: Relieffor Family Caregivers
Who Are Discriminated Against on the Job, 26 HARV. WOMEN'S L.J. 77, 94-102 (2003);
Joan C. Williams, Hibbs as a Federalism Case; Hibbs as a Maternal Wall Case, 73 U. CIN.
L. REV. 365, 388 (2002); infra Part II.B.l.b.
7 See, e.g., WILLIAMS, supra note 5, at 243-70; Mary Becker, Care and Feminists, 17
WIS. WOMEN'S L.J. 57, 109 (2002); Marion Crain, "Where Have All the Cowboys Gone?"
Marriage and Breadwinning in Postindustrial Society, 60 OHIO ST. L.J. 1877, 1932-33
(1999); Nancy E. Dowd, Work and Family: The Gender Paradox and the Limitations of
Discrimination Analysis in Restructuring the Workplace, 24 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 79,
154-55 (1989); Debbie N. Kaminer, The Work-Family Conflict: Developing a Model of
Parental Accommodation in the Workplace, 54 AM. U. L. REV. 305, 333-40 (2004);
Kessler, supra note 1, at 448-67; Malin, supra note 4, at 55-56; Deborah L. Rhode,
Balanced Lives, 102 COLUM. L. REV. 834, 846 (2002); Selmi, supra note 4, at 767-81;
Katharine B. Silbaugh, Foreword. The Structures of Care Work, 76 CHI.-KENT L. REV.
1389, 1390 (2001); Peggie R. Smith, Accommodating Routine Parental Obligations in an
Era of Work-Family Conflict: Lessons from Religious Accommodations, 2001 WIS. L. REV.
1443, 1491-92 (2001); Williams & Segal, supra note 6, at 161; Joan C. Williams,
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discussion toward issues of long-term success and employment quality and in
theorizing normative and doctrinal bases for holding employers responsible for the
status of caregivers. To date, however, their proposals for effecting greater
inclusion of working caregivers have fallen along familiar lines. Some seek
mandated accommodation of workers' caregiving needs beyond the limited, unpaid
leave currently available under the Family Medical Leave Act (the "FMLA").8
Others urge expanded notions of liability and intent under Title VII's prohibition
against gender and pregnancy discrimination. 9 In this way, the current discussion
has proceeded under an assumption, common to both accommodation and
equality-based initiatives, that the problem of caregiver exclusion is one of
inadequate substantive rights for working caregivers vis-A-vis their employers.' 0
This Article steps outside that frame of reference to offer an alternative
approach, one based on organizational justice principles rather than substantive
legal protections. It calls for rules that would require employers not to
accommodate workers, but to establish meaningful procedures for soliciting and
Litigating the Glass Ceiling and the Maternal Wall: Using Stereotyping and Cognitive Bias
Evidence to Prove Gender Discrimination, 7 EMP. RTs. & EMP. POL'Y J. 287, 300-01
(2003).
8 See, e.g., Kaminer, supra note 7, at 308; Kessler, supra note 1, at 372; Selmi, supra
note 4, at 708; Smith, supra note 7, at 1447.
9 See, e.g., WILLIAMS, supra note 5, at 101-10 (proposing strategies for use of
disparate impact and disparate treatment models to oppose workplace practices designed
around male work norms); Travis, supra note 5, at 77-91 (proposing an interpretation of
Title VII in which the "full-time face-time" employment norm is treated as a job practice
subject to disparate impact attack); Williams, supra note 7, at 287 (offering practical
guidance on how to use evidence of stereotyping and cognitive bias to bolster traditional
gender-discrimination claims).
10 In making this generalization, I set aside for the moment proposals that seek to
reform work more generally on behalf of all employees regardless of their status, see, e.g.,
Vicki Schultz, Life's Work, 100 COLUM. L. REv. 1881, 1954-56 (2000) (urging significant
overhaul of the current standards of work time and compensation to allow all workers,
male and female, the ability to work at a livable pace), as well as proposals that seek
greater government-sponsored intervention in family caregiving or wage replacement
programs financed by tax dollars, see, e.g., Rachel Amow-Richman, Accommodation
Subverted: The Future of Work/Family Initiatives in a "Me, Inc. " World, 12 TEX. J.
WOMEN & L. 345, 402-09 (2003) (proposing a system of caregiver wage replacement
funded through employer and employee contributions); Samuel Issacharoff & Elyse
Rosenblum, Women and the Workplace: Accommodating the Demands of Pregnancy, 94
COLUM. L. REv. 2154, 2214-20 (1994) (proposing an insurance model under which
pregnant women would be entitled to twelve weeks of post-partum benefit, a portion of
which would be paid to their employers to ease dislocation costs); Lester, supra note 2, at
66-73 (proposing models of paid family leave programs); Martin H. Malin, Unemployment
Compensation in a Time of Increasing Work-Family Conflicts, 29 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM
131, 133 (1996) (discussing use of unemployment insurance benefits for individuals who
leave their jobs due to family obligations). See generally Katherine Elizabeth Ulrich,
Insuring Family Risks: Suggestions for a National Family Policy and Wage Replacement,
14 YALE J.L. & FEMINISM 1 (2002).
[No. I
HeinOnline  -- 2007 Utah L. Rev. 28 2007
2007] EQUAL EMPLOYMENT QUALITY FOR CAREGIVERS 29
responding to accommodation requests. This move resonates with emerging
developments in other areas of discrimination law in which courts have recognized
the value of procedural initiatives in achieving results under substantive mandates.
Several courts interpreting the Americans with Disabilities Act (the "ADA") have
held that employers must engage in an interactive process with workers to identify
means of accommodating their disabilities." In so doing, they have conferred a
procedural right on workers that supplements their substantive entitlement to
reasonable accommodation under the statute. Similar principles underlie the
Supreme Court's jurisprudence of sexual harassment liability, under which
employers who take voluntary preventative measures and meaningfully respond to
victims' complaints may avoid respondeat superior liability in some instances.
12
Drawing on such initiatives, this Article explores how an organizational justice
approach to caregiver exclusion-one that requires good-faith consideration of
proposed workplace accommodations-can facilitate the adoption of voluntary
organizational changes that enhance the position of working caregivers, even in the
absence of a substantive accommodation requirement.
On a broader level, this Article aspires to refine the relationship between
public regulation and private behavior in achieving results-based equality for all
workers. Recent employment discrimination scholarship reflects skepticism about
the ability of substantive rules to eradicate lingering disparities in employment
quality.13 In this vein, commentators are calling for greater interaction between
employers and those seeking to reform them, recognizing that stimulating viable
private solutions and a social commitment to change is critical to any enduring
workplace reform agenda. 14 The organizational justice approach advocated here
aims to do precisely that. Given the shared interest of employers and employees in
achieving mutually beneficial accommodations, the imposition of procedural
obligations has the potential to achieve individually tailored solutions that may in
some instances prove superior to what could be achieved under externally imposed
"1 See Barnett v. U.S. Air, Inc., 228 F.3d 1105, 1116 (9th Cir. 2000); Beck v. Univ. of
Wis. Bd. of Regents, 75 F.3d 1130, 1135 (7th Cir. 1996); infra Part III.A.2.
12 See Burlington Indus. v. Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742, 764-65 (1998); Faragher v. Boca
Raton, 524 U.S. 775, 805-06 (1998); infra Part III.A. 1.
13 See, e.g., Linda Hamilton Kreiger, Afterword: Socio-Legal Backlash, 21 BERKELEY
J. EMP. & LAB. L. 476, 485-87 (2000) (describing the problem of judicial capture of
transformative substantive rules leading to retrenchment of the status quo); Sturm, supra
note 1, at 475-78 (describing the limits of fixed commands in redressing second-generation
discrimination problems that defy clear rules and boundaries).
14 See, e.g., Kreiger, supra note 13, at 498-503 (describing how interaction with the
community regulated by an appearance-discrimination ordinance helped ensure greater
success in ultimate enforcement); Sturm, supra note 1, at 566 (suggesting a need for greater
attention to the role of mediating institutions, employee organizations, and other private
actors in successful elimination of "second generation" discrimination); cf Cynthia
Estlund, Rebuilding the Law of the Workplace in an Era of Self-Regulation, 105 COLUM. L.
REv. 319, 378-83 (2005) (proposing a model of monitored self regulation for enforcing
labor standards).
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substantive mandates. Under this approach, process supplies an alternative
touchstone for evaluating employer conduct, one that bridges the theoretical gap
between liability and intent.
This Article proceeds as follows: Part II provides an overview of the problem
of caregiver exclusion. It describes the joint problems of structural exclusion and
cognitive bias and examines two sets of responses by legal scholars.1 5 Part III
explores the potential for an alternative, private account of caregiver exclusion. It
highlights three principle features of an organizational justice approach to
caregiver exclusion: an emphasis on internal employer practices as opposed to
external legal standards; the use of incentivizing penalties and presumptions in
addition to substantive rule-based requirements; and a focus on efforts to correct
disparities in employment quality rather than intent to discriminate in assessing
employer liability.1 6 Part III then develops a prescription for incorporating
procedural rights and accompanying incentives in existing laws that protect
caregivers. It proposes an amendment to the FMLA that would confer procedural
rights on qualified workers and a shift in burdens of proof in favor of
discrimination plaintiffs whose employers fail to engage in good-faith
consideration of accommodation requests.' 7 Part IV tests the approach laid out in
Part III. It lays a theoretical basis for an organizational justice approach by
situating these recommendations within the context of increased attention to
private procedures and practices in discrimination scholarship and regulatory
theory generally.' 8 It then contemplates how the prescription is likely to fare in
practice, drawing on a comparable initiative under British law and social science
research on the value of procedural justice. 19 This Article concludes that while
organizational justice is not a panacea, it has the potential to achieve meaningful
solutions for at least some working caregivers and can ideally serve as a model for
more inclusive workplace practices that will benefit all workers.
II. "SECOND-GENERATION" EXCLUSION OF WORKING CAREGIVERS:
THE STATE OF THE LAW AND THE STATE OF REFORM
There are currently two sources of federal protection for working caregivers:
the Pregnancy Discrimination Act and the FMLA, neither of which is equipped to
fully address disparities in employment quality. This section briefly identifies the
key features of these laws and their limitations, and summarizes the primary legal
reform strategies for enhancing current caregiver law. Such efforts principally
target two overlapping categories of employer behavior and their effects on
workers: (1) structural exclusion-the recognition that the design and organization
of work incorporate the sensibilities and preferences of white, male decision
'5 See infra Parts II.A, II.B.1-2.
16 See infra Part III.A.1-2.
17 See infra Part III.B. 1-2.
18 See infra Part IV.A. 1-5.
'9 See infra Part IV.B.1-2.
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makers, 20 and (2) cognitive bias-the discovery that individual exercises of
discretion are affected by unconscious cognitive shortcuts in ways that reflect
social biases.2 '
A. Swiss Cheese Legislation: Existing Protection for Working Caregivers
Existing federal protection for working caregivers consists of a prohibition
against irrational discrimination based on pregnancy and modest unpaid leave for
childbirth, adoption, or the serious illness of a family member. Under the
Pregnancy Discrimination Act, an employer may not treat a pregnant worker
differently than other workers who are similarly situated in their ability to perform
the requirements of their job. In other words, if the employer provides benefits or
accommodations to non-pregnant disabled workers, it must do so for pregnant
workers as well. 23 Of course, the employer is free to distinguish between pregnant
20 See generally Dowd, supra note 7, at 136 ("[T]hose aspects of the workplace which
cause work-family conflict are largely structural features that have resulted from the
adoption of facially neutral policies, or from the inaction and inadequacies of the structure
which generate conflict between work-family roles."); Green, supra note 1, at 92-95
(describing modem discrimination as facilitated by group dynamics, organizational
structure, and institutional practices); Sturm, supra note 1, at 468-70 (suggesting that overt
discrimination "operates in tandem with or is supplanted by subtle, interactive, and
structural bias"). Cf Michael A. Rebell, Structural Discrimination and the Rights of the
Disabled, 74 GEO. L.J. 1435, 1452 (1986) ("[T]he critical analytical problem of
discrimination in the handicapped context now is less one of overcoming bigotry and
invidious prejudice than one of redesigning social structures and institutions to make them
more responsive to the needs of the disabled segment of the population. It is, in short, a
problem of structural change."); see infra Part II.B. l.a.
21 See generally Linda Hamilton Krieger, The Content of Our Categories: A Cognitive
Bias Approach to Discrimination and Equal Employment Opportunity, 47 STAN. L. REv.
1161, 1187 (1995) (discussing the theory of social cognition that describes how cognitive
structures and processes involved in categorization and information processing often result
in stereotyping); Amy L. Wax, Discrimination as Accident, 74 IND. L.J. 1129, 1131 (1999)
(characterizing "inadvertent bias" as the result of decision makers' reliance on "reflexive or
unthinking distortions in the application of neutral and seemingly reasonable criteria to the
assessment of employees from disfavored groups"); Williams & Segal, supra note 6, at 94-
101 (describing how prescriptive and benevolent stereotyping affect employers'
perceptions and evaluation of pregnant workers and workers returning from maternity
leave). See infra Part II.B. l.b.
22 The PDA is an amendment to Title VII which provides that discrimination on the
basis of "sex" includes discrimination on the basis of pregnancy. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(k)
(2006).
23 See, e.g., Deneen v. Nw. Airlines, Inc., 132 F.3d 431, 437 (8th Cir. 1998) (finding
that an occupational qualification that an airline customer service agent must be able to lift
luggage of up to seventy-five pounds applied to a pregnant employee but not other
employees could be viewed by a reasonable jury as discriminatory); Byrd v. Lakeshore
Hosp., 30 F.3d 1380, 1383-84 (1 1th Cir. 1994) (finding discrimination where pregnant
employee who took sick leave was terminated while other temporarily disabled or sick
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and non-pregnant workers on legitimate business grounds, or simply to treat all
workers "equally badly. ' 4 Under the FMLA, an employee of either gender25 is
entitled to a maximum of twelve weeks of unpaid, job-protected leave for a
discrete set of qualifying caregiving-related events.2 6 These events include birth or
adoption, serious health condition of a family member, and medical conditions
related to pregnancy.27 However, benefits are limited to unpaid leave, the
continuation of medical insurance, and the right to job reinstatement. 2' The
employer need not provide anything further to an employee who requires
additional time off beyond the twelve-week period or some lesser form of
accommodation.2 9
To illustrate the limitations of these laws, consider the following:
Illustration 1: A pregnant woman is employed as a delivery truck
driver. Part of her job involves lifting and loading inventory. Due to
complications with her pregnancy, her physician advises her not to lift
objects in excess of fifteen pounds. In the past the employer has
authorized short-term lifting restrictions for employees suffering from a
temporary disability. She requests such a restriction, and is denied.3 °
employees in similar positions were not); United States v. Bd. of Educ., 983 F.2d 790,
798-99 (7th Cir. 1993) (holding that the employer's maternity leave policy was
discriminatory because it prohibited pregnant teachers from combining paid sick leave with
unpaid maternity leave but allowed non-pregnant sick teachers to combine sick leave with
other forms of unpaid leave).
24 Troupe v. May Dep't Stores Co., 20 F.3d 734, 738 (7th Cir. 1994); see also Stout v.
Baxter Healthcare Corp., 282 F.3d 856, 860 (5th Cir. 2002) (finding no unlawful
discrimination because "[a]lthough [employer]'s policy results in the dismissal of any
pregnant or post-partum employee who misses more than three days of work during the
probationary period, it equally requires the termination of any non-pregnant employee who
misses more than three days"); Gorman v. Wells Mfg. Corp., 209 F. Supp. 2d 970, 980
(S.D. Iowa 2002) (finding against pregnant employee fired for absenteeism related to her
pregnancy because she "failed to meet her burden to produce any evidence that similarly
situated non-protected class employees were treated more favorably than she").
25 See 29 U.S.C. § 2611(2); 29 C.F.R. § 825.112(b) (2006).
26 See 29 U.S.C. § 2612(a)(1); 29 C.F.R. § 825.112(a).
27 See 29 U.S.C. § 2612(a)(1)(A)-(D); 29 C.F.R. §§ 825.100(a), 825.112(a), (c).
FMLA leave is also available for serious health conditions of the employee other than
pregnancy. Because this Article deals with the needs of working caregivers, however, I
focus here on how the FMLA protects those who require leave as a result of a new child or
to care for others.
28 See 29 U.S.C. §§ 2612(c)-(d), 2614(a), (c); 29 C.F.R. § 825.200(a)-(c).
29 Both the FMLA and the PDA have been widely criticized on these grounds. See,
e.g., WILLIAMS, supra note 5, at 112, 229, 237; Kessler, supra note 1, at 374-76; Selmi,
supra note 4, at 711.
30 This illustration is based on Walker v. Fred Nesbit Distributing Co., 356 F. Supp.
2d 964, 965-66 (S.D. Iowa 2005).
[No. I
HeinOnline  -- 2007 Utah L. Rev. 32 2007
2007] EQUAL EMPLOYMENT QUALITY FOR CAREGIVERS 33
In this scenario, the employee has limited rights under the PDA and the
FMLA. Under the PDA she is entitled to the lifting restriction only if the employer
makes that accommodation for other disabled workers. If so, by denying the
restriction, the employer is arguably discriminating against her based on
pregnancy. However, the employer may interpose a valid reason for the distinction,
arguing, for instance, that past lifting restrictions were provided only to workers
injured on the job and not for non-work-related disabilities.31 If this distinction has
a legitimate financial basis, the PDA claim will be unavailing.3 z Fortunately, this
employee is entitled to benefits under the FMLA. Because her medical condition is
related to pregnancy, it constitutes a "serious health condition" of the employee,
which is considered a qualifying event.33 However, the only benefit she can
demand is unpaid leave, meaning she will be forced to stop working entirely and
lose her salary.34 The FMLA does not give her the ability to insist on the lesser
accommodation of a lifting restriction. Also, she is limited to twelve weeks.35
31See, e.g., Spivey v. Beverly Enters., Inc., 196 F.3d 1309, 1313 (11th Cir. 1999)
(finding no discrimination in failure to grant lifting restriction to pregnant employee where
employer's policy provided modified-duty accommodations only to employees suffering
occupational injuries); Urbano v. Cont'l Airlines, Inc., 138 F.3d 204, 206 (5th Cir. 1998)
(same); Walker, 356 F. Supp. 2d at 969 (same).
32 In this way, pregnancy claims follow the same burden of proof structure associated
with other disparate treatment claims: the employer prevails if the jury believes its decision
was motivated exclusively by a legitimate non-discriminatory reason, see St. Mary's Honor
Ctr. v. Hicks, 509 U.S. 502, 506-07 (1993); Tex. Dep't of Cmty. Affairs v. Burdine, 450
U.S. 248, 254-55 (1981); McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802 (1973),
or that its decision was motivated by discriminatory and non-discriminatory reasons, the
latter being sufficient to motivate the adverse decision, see Desert Palace, Inc. v. Costa,
539 U.S. 90, 93-94 (2003); Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 241-42 (1989). In
the mixed-motive situation, according to the Civil Rights Act of 1991, the employer is
technically still in violation of Title VII because it took account of the employee's
protected status in its deliberations, but its liability is only nominal; the plaintiff is not
entitled to a damage award. Civil Rights Act of 1991 § 107, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g).
33 Under the FMLA, a "serious health condition" means an illness, injury,
impairment, or physical or mental condition that involves inpatient care in a hospital,
hospice, or residential medical care facility; or continuing treatment by a health care
provider. 29 U.S.C. § 2611(11); see also 29 C.F.R. § 825.114(a).
34 As many have noted, the absence of any compensation requirement makes FMLA
leave time of limited use to many workers. See, e.g., Donna Lenhoff & Claudia Withers,
Impelemenation of the Family and Medical Leave Act: Toward the Family-Friendly
Workplace, 3 AMER. U. J. OF GENDER & L. 39, 53 (1994) ("To make the right to family and
medical leave a meaningful one to all workers, policymakers must devise a method to
provide workers with paid family and medical leave."); Rhode, supra note 7, at 845 ("Only
about seven percent of those eligible for FMLA leaves actually take them, generally
because they cannot afford to do so."); Jane Rigler, Analysis and Understanding of the
Family and Medical Leave Act of 1993, 45 CASE W. RES. L. REv. 457, 479 (1995) ("For
those poorly paid employees who have no (or limited use of) paid vacation, sick leave or
family leave, the FMLA may simply be irrelevant.").
15 29 U.S.C. § 2612(a)(1); 29 C.F.R. § 825.200(a).
HeinOnline  -- 2007 Utah L. Rev. 33 2007
UTAH LAW REVIEW
Thus, if her lifting limitation endures for the full term of her pregnancy and she
remains off work, she will lose her right to job reinstatement.3 6 In addition, by
using up the full twelve weeks of leave during her pregnancy, the employee will
have no FMLA leave time to care for her newborn following childbirth.37
Illustration 2: An in-house attorney adopts a healthy child. She
takes twelve weeks of unpaid leave under the FMLA and returns from
leave full-time. After a few months, she realizes she is unable to meet the
demands of her job and adequately care for her child. She asks to work a
four-day week (a male administrative assistant currently has that work
arrangement), but her supervisor denies the request because "all of the
attorneys in the office work full-time." One year later she is laid off in a
legitimate reduction in force. She is selected based on her relatively high
absence record and light caseload compared to other attorneys in the
office.
In this scenario, the employee has no protection under either statute. Because
she is not and was not pregnant, she is not within the class of persons protected
under the PDA. In theory, she could allege discriminatory failure to accommodate
under Title VII, arguing that she was unfairly treated vis-d-vis the male employee
who was permitted to work part-time.38 However, as with the truck driver's PDA
claim, success turns on the presence of appropriate comparators and, in this
scenario, the facts suggest the male employee, who holds a significantly different
position, is not similarly situated.39 As for the subsequent layoff, if the employer's
36 See, e.g., Hicks v. Leroy's Jewelers, Inc., No. 98-6596, 2000 WL 1033029, at *3
(6th Cir. July 17, 2000) (finding no FMLA violation in employer's decision to terminate
employee who failed to return to work after the twelve-week leave period due to
complications during childbirth); Grosenick v. SmithKline Beecham Corp., No. 03-CV-
2607, 2005 WL 1719117, at *4-5 (D. Minn. July 22, 2005) (finding no FMLA violation
where employer replaced an employee after the twelve-week leave period because it never
received notice from the employee's doctor indicating that the employee could come back
to work).
" See 29 U.S.C. § 2612(a)(1) (entitling an employee to twelve work weeks of leave
during any twelve-month period for qualified reasons); 29 C.F.R. § 825.200(a) (limiting an
eligible employee's FMLA leave entitlement to twelve weeks of leave during any twelve-
month period). Cf. 29 C.F.R. § 825.214(b) ("If the employee is unable to perform an
essential function of the position because of a physical or mental condition, including the
continuation of a serious health condition, the employee has no right to restoration to
another position under the FMLA.")..
38 See, e.g., Orr v. Albuquerque, 417 F.3d 1144, 1152 (10th Cir. 2005) (finding prima
facie case of pregnancy discrimination where employer allowed some male workers to use
compensatory time for FMLA leave, but forced plaintiffs to use accrued sick leave for
FMLA leave following childbirth).
39 See, e.g., Spivey v. Beverly Enters., Inc., 196 F.3d 1309, 1313 (11th Cir. 1999)
(finding for purposes of discriminatory failure to accommodate claim that "correct
comparison is between Appellant and other employees who suffer non-occupational
[No. I
HeinOnline  -- 2007 Utah L. Rev. 34 2007
2007] EQUAL EMPLOYMENT QUALITY FOR CAREGIVERS 35
explanation for its selection is true, the termination is lawful. Because the
employee is past the qualifying event of child birth, and assuming her absences are
attributable to the ordinary demands of parenting (rather than a serious health
condition of her child), the FMLA is inapplicable.40
Illustration 3: Same facts as Illustration 2, above, except the
employee is a male computer programmer and he requests part-time
work to care for an ill parent rather than a child.
Here the employee is in a slightly better position. If the parent's illness
qualifies as a serious health condition, the programmer will qualify for FMLA
leave and may be able to take the leave on an intermittent basis approximating
part-time employment.41 If the employer fails to oblige, the programmer can bring
a claim for interference with FMLA rights.42 His entitlement to intermittent leave,
however, is in lieu of full-time leave. If he chooses to use the twelve weeks upon
the immediate onset of the illness, like the attorney in Illustration 2 who takes full-
time leave upon the adoption, he too will have no further accommodation or leave
rights to deal with ongoing caregiving demands. The programmer is also in a better
position in the event of a future layoff. If his part-time leave is FMLA-eligible, the
employer may not use it as a basis for an adverse employment decision.43 That
protection ends, however, when the qualified leave ends. In other words, if his
attendance declines or his work suffers after returning to full-time status, the
employer would have a legitimate non-discriminatory reason for terminating him
that would likely defeat a subsequent retaliation claim.
Thus, the PDA and the FMLA each are a partial solution to caregiver
exclusion. While the PDA protects pregnant workers from some forms of
differential treatment, it does so only in situations where the pregnant employee is
not limited in her ability to perform or where comparably limited non-pregnant
disabilities, not between Appellant and employees who are injured on the job "); Urbano v.
Cont'l Airlines, Inc., 138 F.3d 204, 208 (5th Cir. 1998) (finding that "Continental treated
Urbano the same as it treats any other worker who suffered an injury off duty. There is no
probative evidence that Continental's distinction between occupational and off-the-job
injuries was a pretext for discrimination against pregnant women.")
40 See 29 C.F.R. § 825.114 ("Ordinarily, unless complications arise, the common
cold, the flu, earaches, upset stomach ... are examples of conditions that do not meet the
definition of a serious health condition and do not qualify for FMLA leave.").
41 Intermittent leave is an entitlement only for those who need such leave as a result of
a qualifying medical condition of the employee or his or her family member. See 29 C.F.R.
§ 825.203(c)(2). Intermittent leave for a new child is at the discretion of the employer. See
id. § 825.203(b).
42 See 29 U.S.C. § 2615(a); 29 C.F.R. § 825.220.
43 Recent cases also suggest that "mixed motive" analysis would apply to this claim.
Thus the employee's qualified absences need only be a motivating factor in the layoff
decision, and not the sole cause, for a finding of discrimination. See Richardson v.
Monitronics Int'l, Inc., 434 F.3d 327, 334-35 (5th Cir. 2005) (applying Desert Palace in
FMLA case); supra note 32.
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employees are more favorably treated. It mandates no accommodation of pregnant
employees and is completely silent on issues of caregiver exclusion that occur after
pregnancy. The FMLA does mandate some accommodation of the real effects of
caregiving, but it does so only in the context of critical life events-birth or serious
illness-ignoring the constraints imposed by the everyday demands of caregiving.
In addition, its mandate is inflexible. The only type of accommodation that an
employer must provide is a fixed amount of unpaid leave; an employee who
desires more or less flexibility is without recourse.
B. Filling the Holes? Contemporary Models of Legal Reform
Scholars and advocates have responded to these limitations with a variety of
proposals for expanded employment discrimination and family leave protection
that better address the needs of caregivers. Their proposals fall largely in one of
two related categories. The first, which I call the "expanded intent" model, aims to
reinterpret existing non-discrimination directives to embrace employer conduct and
workplace structures that may be subtly tied to bias or perpetuate biased effects,
but which are not routed in group-based animus. The second, which I refer to as
the "mandated benefit" model, aims to legislate additional employer-provided
benefits for caregivers and greater accommodation of their job-related limitations.
Both models provide theoretical foundations for enhancing the rights of caregivers
and are likely to provide additional legal protection to some plaintiffs; however,
neither offers a unifying theory for pursuing legal change, nor can they address the
range of situations that compromise caregivers' employment quality. This
subsection briefly explains the two models and their limitations.
1. The Expanded Intent Approach: Caregiver Exclusion as Gender or Pregnancy
Discrimination
To the extent existing laws have traditionally conceived of discrimination as
intentional behavior predicated on group-based animus, they may be ill-equipped
to respond to employer behavior and workplace structures that are either benign in
intent or entirely unintentional. 44 In light of this, an initial aim of second-
generation scholarship has been to reinterpret existing anti-discrimination laws in
ways that hold employers accountable for employment quality disparities
regardless of their source. This has been achieved principally by arguing for an
expanded notion of intent that better reflects the way second-generation exclusion
manifests in the contemporary workplace.
44 See generally Green, supra note 1, at 91; Kreiger, supra note 13, at 485. But see
Hart, supra note 3, at 766 (suggesting that scholars have overstated the problem of
addressing unconscious discrimination through existing law and that Title VII, properly
understood and applied, is up to the task of uprooting such behavior); Michael Selmi, Was
the Disparate Impact Theory a Mistake?, 53 UCLA L. REv. 701, 744-46 (2006)
(suggesting that instances of biased application of subjective employment standards can
appropriately be framed as intentional disparate treatment claims).
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(a) Challenging Work Structures
Some scholars suggest that structural exclusion of women caregivers may be
attacked through formal equality rules by rigorously analyzing existing work
requirements and their justifications.45 Most jobs are designed with the expectation
that workers can perform forty hours or more per week and will take little or no
time off for childbearing or rearing during the course of their career.46 While that
design was not selected out of animus or a desire to exclude, it tends to
disadvantage workers who do not conform to this ideal worker norm.
Thus, pregnant women and women with children may find it difficult to break into
the labor market, while those who are employed may find themselves passed over
for promotions and plum assignments, particularly in jobs that demand frequent
travel and overtime.4 7 In situations such as these, where employers' "legitimate"
demands exclude or disadvantage caregivers, courts should deconstruct the
justifications for those requirements and consider alternative ways for employers to
package and evaluate work.48
In application, this theory addresses some of the gaps in existing law
identified in the previous section. It might, for instance, allow the truck driver in
Illustration 1 to challenge the employer's bundling of job functions (lifting and
driving) as a discriminatory job practice that disparately impacts pregnant women.
Similarly, it could enable the lawyer in Illustration 2 to challenge the hours and
structure of her job (full-time/full-week) as disparately impacting women, who
serve as the primary caregivers in most families. Both plaintiffs could argue that
their employer's failure to alter work structures and practices in the face of
exclusionary effects constitutes a form of unlawful gender discrimination.
Certainly there is some precedent to suggest potential for cases like this, 49 but,
as a practical matter, the approach is likely to have only minimal effect. Despite
the codification of disparate impact jurisprudence in the 1991 Civil Rights Act
45 See WILLIAMS, supra note 5, at 101-10.
46 See id. at 1; Kessler, supra note 1, at 374-75 (describing ideal workers as providing
a full-time, uninterrupted stream of market work); Travis, supra note 5, at 6 (describing a
"full-time face-time" norm that requires "full-time positions, unlimited hours, rigid work
schedules, an uninterrupted work life, and performance of work at a central location").
47 See WILLIAMS, supra note 5, at 71-76 (discussing the creation of a marginalized
"mommy track" for caregivers within professional firms and the ab initio exclusion of
women from most blue-collar jobs); Williams & Segal, supra note 6, at 95 n.l 18
(describing how employers pass over caregivers for positions requiring frequent travel).
48 See Williams & Segal, supra note 6, at 109 (arguing that the ability to work in an
environment defined by and structured around male bodies and norms cannot be a
legitimate job qualification).
49 See, e.g., EEOC v. Warshawsky & Co., 768 F. Supp. 647, 654-55 (N.D. I11. 1991)
(finding the employer's policy of terminating any first-year employee requiring long-term
sick leave disparately impacted women who could become pregnant despite the employer's
assertion that the policy reduced turnover).
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Amendments, successful "unintentional" discrimination cases have been rare.5°
Existing law permits employers to avoid liability for exclusionary effects where a
challenged job practice is supported by a legitimate business decision. 5' That
defense has been broadly construed to include not only decisions based on cost, but
other acts of managerial discretion not intended-in the traditional sense of the
word-to exclude.52 In addition, courts have taken a narrow view of what it means
to demonstrate a "job practice" that creates a disparate effect, refusing to treat
workplace norms as practices. 53 For these reasons, it is unlikely courts will accept
the underlying idea that an employer's failure to alter its work practices in light of
disparities in the employment quality of caregivers is equivalent to gender
discrimination absent some further elaboration by Congress. 4
Moreover, even if courts were willing to embrace this liability theory it would
do nothing to ameliorate the male computer programmer's situation in Illustration
3 if his parent's illness is not FMLA-eligible or if he exhausts his leave
entitlement. An expansive reading of disparate-impact law is premised on the
notion that women, as the primary caregivers in most families, are
disproportionately harmed relative to men by traditional work structures. As long
as this gendered division of labor persists, men will not be able to take advantage
of the theory because they will not be able to show the requisite disparate impact
on the basis of sex. Thus, if mainstreaming male caregiving practices is a real goal
of the work/family balance movement, other long-term strategies will be needed.
50 See Selmi, Disparate Impact Theory, supra note 44 at 738-43 (reporting limited
success rate of plaintiffs in empirical study of disparate impact cases).
51 See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(k)(1)(A)(i) (2006) (providing that a plaintiff establishes a
disparate statistical impact where "the respondent fails to demonstrate that the challenged
practice is job related for the position in question and consistent with business necessity").
52 See, e.g., Personnel Adm'r of Mass. v. Feeney, 442 U.S. 256, 265 (1979) (finding
no disparate impact in the state's use of preference in hiring veterans as the practice was
"justified as a measure designed to reward veterans for the sacrifice of military service, to
ease the transition from military to civilian life, to encourage patriotic service, and to attract
loyal and well-disciplined people to civil service occupations"); Chambers v. Omaha Girls
Club, 629 F. Supp. 925, 951 (D. Neb. 1986) (finding no actionable disparate impact in the
employer's practice of terminating single pregnant women where the practice furthered its
goal of "fostering growth and maturity of young girls"). But see Christine Jolls,
Commentary: Antidiscrimination and Accommodation, 115 HARV. L. REv. 642, 653-63
(2001) (summarizing other disparate impact cases in which courts have held employers
liable despite the presence of a legitimate business rationale for the challenged job
practice).
53 See Travis, supra note 5, at 39-46.
54 See Kathryn Abrams, Cross-Dressing in the Master's Clothes, 109 YALE L.J. 745,
754-61 (2000) (reviewing WILLIAMS, supra note 5, and questioning practical viability of
her proposals); Selmi, Disparate Impact Theory, supra note 44 at 750-51 (suggesting that
although many common employer policies "almost certainly have a disparate impact [on
pregnant women or women with childrearing responsibilities], they are also subject to an
employer's business rationale, and few courts appear willing to undo standard business
practices without a far stronger statutory mandate").
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(o) Capturing Cognitive Bias
Another avenue for expanding the concept of intent draws on the scientific
understanding of cognitive bias. Psychological research teaches that identifying
and accounting for human differences is part of the natural cognition process
through which the brain categorizes information in order to manage it efficiently.55
The brain represents these cognitive categories through a mental image, or schema,
which operates both as a prototype for that category and as a set of predictions
about what we perceive.56
In the workplace, cognitive bias can result in both stereotyping and in-group
favoritism, which may prevent employers from fairly evaluating the qualifications
or performance of non-traditional employees, including caregivers.57 In the case of
pregnancy, the physical appearance of a pregnant worker tends to exacerbate
gender stereotypes about the appropriate role of women.58 Thus, employers may
regard pregnant employees as too soft or subdued for an important position or
assignment; or, in the case of a pregnant worker who is assertive, inappropriately
aggressive or pushy. 59 Similarly, childbearing and motherhood are associated with
a loss of competence, dependability, and commitment to the job, perceptions that
endure past the conclusion of pregnancy.6 ° Importantly, such biases affect not only
55 See Krieger, supra note 21, at 1188-89 ('Since no organism can cope with infinite
diversity, one of the most basic functions of all organisms is the cutting up of the
environment into classifications by which nonidentical stimuli can be treated as
equivalent."' (quoting Eleanor Rosch, Human Categorization, in STUDIES IN CROSS-
CULTURAL PSYCHOLOGY 1, 1-2 (Neil Warren ed., 1977))).
56 See id. at 1190 (discussing the theory of social cognition that describes how
cognitive structures and processes involved in categorization and information processing
often result in stereotyping); Wax, supra note 21, at 1131 (characterizing "inadvertent bias"
as the result of decision makers' reliance on "reflexive or unthinking distortions in the
application of neutral and seemingly reasonable criteria to the assessment of employees
from disfavored groups").
57 See Krieger, supra note 21, at 1206 (noting that where both male and female
employees perform a stereotypically male task poorly, the female may be more severely
punished because the supervisor sees her performance as "dispositional" and sees the
male's performance as "situational"); Williams, supra note 7, at 294 (describing "the
tendency of in-groups to apply objective rules rigorously to outsiders but flexibly to
insiders").
58 See Huhta et al., supra note 6, at 318.
59 See id. at 18 (describing how stereotypes place a pregnant woman in a double bind
in that "she can conform to a feminine script and be judged to 'lack drive' and competence;
or she can continue to be hard-driving and be judged to have personality problems");
Williams, supra note 6, at 388 (citing a study that found performance reviews of pregnant
managers plummeted due to stereotypes of women as irrational and overly emotional).
60 See Huhta et al., supra note 6, at 318-20 (summarizing studies demonstrating that
working mothers received competence ratings equivalent to those of elderly, retarded, and
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particular personnel decisions, but the everyday assessment of workers that forms
the basis for later action. Thus, a supervisor may notice the errors or absences of a
working mother, but not those of a working father, and as a consequence develop
an unjustifiably critical view of the mother relative to her coworkers.61
In response to such research, scholars have proposed disaggregating intent
and causation to accommodate the fact that disparate treatment can result absent a
conscious discriminatory purpose.62 As long as a decision is "actuated" by bias,
liability should attach, entitling the worker to the equitable remedies available to
successful disparate impact plaintiffs.63 Thus, an employer would be liable where
stray comments and other circumstantial evidence suggest an employer's decision
was influenced by the belief that mothers are not committed to their jobs and
should stay at home with their children.64 Similarly, an employer would be liable
where an employment action is based on performance judgments that reflect
unjustified assumptions about a caregiver's competence, as, for instance, where
written evaluations show unprecedented negative evaluations following pregnancy
or childbirth.65 Under this theory, such decisions would be treated as
discriminatory despite the subconscious nature of the bias.
The cognitive bias approach is likely to prove fruitful in a subset of cases in
which employer decisions appear suspect. Indeed, the Supreme Court recently
approved an interpretation of causation that is likely to expand situations where
juries can find liability on the basis of a mixed motive. 66 Under Desert Palace v.
Costa, a plaintiff demonstrates discrimination where she shows, by any evidence,
that consideration of impermissible characteristics played at least a part in the
employer's decision.67 This could be useful in situations where employers allege
"neutral" reasons for treating caregivers differently from other workers. Thus, in
disabled workers, and that pregnant women received lower performance ratings than non-
pregnant women engaging in identical behavior).
61 See Krieger, supra note 21, at 1196-97 (describing how individuals are likely to
overestimate the co-occurrence of salient events and characteristics, such as the frequency
of negative behaviors by minority group members).62 Id. at 1242.
63 Liability would be subject to an affirmative defense that the employer would have
made the same decision absent the effects of bias comparable to a mixed motive analysis.
Id. at 1243. Krieger's approach would reserve compensatory and punitive damages for
cases involving conscious use of group status. Id.
64 See, e.g., Trezza v. The Hartford Inc., No. 98 Civ. 2205, 1998 WL 912101, at *2
(S.D.N.Y. Dec. 30, 1998) (employee was told among other things that 'working mothers
cannot be both good mothers and good workers" and "women are not good planners,
especially women with kids").
65 See, e.g., Sigmon v. Parker Chapin Flattau & Klimpt, 901 F. Supp. 667, 674
(S.D.N.Y. 1995) (employee who had positive pre-pregnancy reviews received review that
she had "come down substantially" following return from maternity leave).
66 See Desert Palace, Inc. v. Costa, 539 U.S. 90, 101-02 (2003) (holding a mixed-
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the illustration of the terminated attorney, the employer might be found to have
been discriminatory in selecting the plaintiff for layoff if the decision was
motivated in part by a stereotypical belief that the plaintiff would probably prefer
to stay home. It might also be possible to call into question the supposedly
legitimate bases for the attorney's selection for layoff. The supervisor might have
taken undue note of the plaintiffs attendance record or limited her assignments
based on a misperception about her commitment level. In the pregnant truck driver
situation, the plaintiff could argue that despite an otherwise valid distinction
between her disability (which was not work-related) and those of previously
accommodated workers (who were injured on the job), the employer's decision
was to some extent influenced by the seeming incongruity of a pregnant woman
driving a truck.
While somewhat less explored, cognitive bias theory might also help male
caregivers like the computer programmer in Illustration 3. Some have suggested
that men who deviate from the stereotypical male work pattern by assuming
significant caregiving responsibilities encounter explicit harassment.61 If so,
implicit bias based on sex stereotyping may play a role as well. For instance,
suppose the programmer takes FMLA leave and is subsequently laid off based on
the "legitimate" reason that he does not fit in with his all male work team. That
perception may reflect latent assumptions about male caregiving and be subject to
challenge as a form of gender discrimination.69 It is also possible to envision a
failure to accommodate claim by a male worker, due to implicit assumptions about
the appropriate division of labor within the family. Thus, some supervisors might
make accommodations for women-for instance by making informal arrangements
to temporarily reduce workload following maternity leave-but fail to do so for
men, based in part on the assumption that fathers should make work their first
priority and let their wives handle the family.
70
As these examples illustrate, cognitive bias theory is only availing in
scenarios that replicate a traditional pattern of disparate treatment: either the
plaintiffs performance must be equivalent to non-caregivers, or there must be
evidence of comparators with similar limitations who were treated better. For this
reason, the theory does little more than offer an additional evidentiary route to
proving the type of gender stereotyping that the law already recognizes as
discriminatory. v Cognitive bias theory has nothing to say about the trucking
68 See Malin, supra note 4, at 39-42.
69 See Tristin K. Green, Work Culture and Discrimination, 93 CAL. L. REv. 623, 646-
50 (2005) (explaining that work culture tends to reflect traditional race and gender norms).
70 See Hibbs v. Nevada, 538 U.S. 721, 731 (2003) (summarizing the long history of
protectionist employer policies geared toward mothers and the exclusion of men from
parental leave and other policies accommodating caregiving).
71 See Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228 (1989). Presumably, the advantage
of cognitive bias theory is that it affords plaintiffs a scientific basis through which to
attribute adverse employer behavior to stereotyping despite the absence of explicit
comments or conduct. It remains to be seen, however, whether courts will be receptive to
hearing social science evidence on this point, as well as whether the plaintiffs bar will be
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company's failure to allow light duty if it does not make such accommodations for
similarly situated male employees. Neither would it have any impact if the female
attorney or the male computer programmer had been accommodated and their jobs
subsequently selected for layoff because they were not working as many hours as
others in their positions.
72
2. The Mandated Benefit Approach: Caregiver Inclusion as a Fair Labor
Standards Obligation
In contrast, the mandated-benefits approach responds to precisely those
scenarios in which caregivers are unable to compete on equal terms as
unencumbered workers by requiring employers to accommodate affected
employees. Mandated-benefit proposals rely on either the minimum labor
standards approach of the FMLA or the accommodation model of the ADA and
Title VII vis-d-vis religious discrimination. Proposals building on the FMLA
generally seek to supplement the statute's unpaid leave requirement, either by
requiring at least partial pay during the leave period73 or augmenting the
circumstances in which leave may be taken.7 4 Proposals building on the ADA and
Title VII seek more tailored accommodations, proposing, for instance, a general
duty to "reasonably accommodate" caregiving comparable to the requirement to
accommodate disabilities and religious beliefs.7 5
willing to incur the expenses necessary to engage cognitive bias experts.
72 See Ilhardt v. Sara Lee Corp., 118 F.3d 1151, 1152 (7th Cir. 1997) (no
discrimination in elimination of part-time position held by female attorney who had moved
to part-time status following childbirth).
73 See, e.g., Selmi, supra note 4, at 770-71 (recommending that federal law be
amended to require employers to pay six weeks of FMLA-qualifying leave per worker);
Jeremy I. Bohrer, Recent Development, You, Me, and the Consequences of Family: How
Federal Employment Law Prevents the Shattering of the "Glass Ceiling," 50 WASH. U. J.
URB. & CONTEMP. L. 401, 420 (1996) (suggesting that employers pay at least a portion of
FMLA leave in order to accommodate those employees who could not otherwise afford to
take time off).
74 See Family and Medical Leave Improvements Act of 1997, H.R. 109, 105th Cong.
§ 3 (1997) (proposing employees be entitled to take an additional twenty-four hours of
FMLA leave in any twelve-month period to "participate in school activities directly related
to the educational advancement of a son or daughter of the employee, such as parent-
teacher conferences or interviewing for a new school" and "accompany the son or daughter
of the employee to routine medical or dental appointments, such as checkups or
vaccinations").
75 See, e.g., Kessler, supra note 1, at 457-59 (suggesting that the ADA and the
religious accommodation provisions of Title VII "offer[] . . . promising model[s] of
substantive equality on which to build a theory of workplace accommodation for family
caregiving responsibilities"); Smith, supra note 7, at 1445-48, 1465-79 (proposing a model
of employer accommodation of family caregiving that would follow the procedural
framework associated with religious accommodation claims under Title VII and rely to an
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In all of the previous illustrations, an ADA-like accommodation mandate
might enable the plaintiffs to obtain needed alterations in the structure of their jobs.
The truck driver would have a legal basis for seeking a lifting restriction or a
change in job duties, while the attorney and programmer would each have the right
to seek part-time work or some other reduced-time arrangement in addition to any
FMLA entitlement. Depending on the circumstances of the individual case, and the
definition of reasonableness adopted by courts or the legislature, the employer
might be obligated to grant these requests. Under FMLA reform, the effects on
these hypothetical plaintiffs would vary depending on the nature of the
amendment. Expanding the scope of the FMLA to allow leave for general
parenting responsibilities could permit the attorney to work reduced hours in some
weeks, albeit without pay. Requiring partial pay would allow the truck driver to
draw some compensation while absent due to her pregnancy.
While such approaches could make a meaningful difference to working
caregivers if adopted, there are significant pragmatic and normative obstacles to
their success. FMLA-type reforms require the selection of specified benefits that
may or may not assist all caregivers. As the truck driver example illustrates, more
leave (and paid leave, for that matter) is not always the best answer, as where a
closely tailored accommodation like disaggregating job duties would enable the
employee to continue working. In contrast, generalized accommodation mandates
that require a reasonable accommodation suited to the circumstances would allow
for such flexibility. Yet, such proscriptions are highly subjective. Existing
accommodation mandates have been interpreted narrowly with courts routinely
finding unreasonable requests by disabled employees to work from home,
restructure their job, or work reduced or flexible hours-the very accommodations
that would most help caregivers. 76 Moreover, the open-ended nature of a
"reasonable" accommodation proscription creates significant uncertainty and
administrative difficulties for employers. 7
In addition, the affirmative regulation of employers inherent in the mandated-
benefits approach raises questions about the normative basis for placing additional
responsibilities on employers. Accommodation is often equated with "affirmative
action" and consequently can occasion backlash from both judges and members of
society who mistrust the redistributive agenda of such initiatives. 8 Some have
extent on unemployment compensation case law to determine when an employee has a
compelling family obligation that conflicts with work).
76 See Amow-Richman, supra note 10, at 365-66 (summarizing case examples);
Travis, supra note 5, at 6.
77Cf Samuel Issacharoff & Justin Nelson, Discrimination with a Difference: Can
Employment Discrimination Law Accommodate the Americans with Disabilities Act?, 79
N.C. L. REv. 307, 347-55 (critiquing the ADA's imposition of an unspecified redistributive
requirement that arbitrarily burdens individual employers).
78 See Krieger, supra note 13, at 497 (describing the problem of "socio-legal
backlash" that occurs "when the application of a transformative legal regime generates
outcomes that conflict with norms and institutions to which influenced segments of the
relevant populace retain strong conscious allegiance").
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suggested, for instance, that the constrained judicial approach to interpreting the
ADA reflects a lack of commitment to the transformative mission of the statute.79
Courts have demonstrated similar ambivalence in interpreting key aspects of the
FMLA, 80 and its provisions have been subject to intense criticism by the business
community.
8 1
More problematic is that developments in the workplace and the economy
indicate a shift away from the concept of the employer as a protector and provider
for its workforce. Two related developments fuel this trend-the decline in long-
term employment and the reduction in employer-provided benefits. 82 Where
careers consist of a series of short-term business transactions rather than a lifetime
relationship with a single party, it becomes difficult to justify assigning one
employer responsibility for absorbing the inevitable costs of accommodating the
life needs of a particular worker.83 Moreover, where employees increasingly lack
basic benefits like health insurance, it makes little sense to talk of mandating the
provision of additional lifecycle benefits.
C. Conclusion
Existing approaches to workplace reform have made important contributions
to the work/family dialogue, both by theorizing bases for liability absent animus
and calling attention to the need for greater accommodation of caregiving. In
79 See id. at 497-98. For additional information on popular sentiment about the
ADA's accommodation mandate, see Samuel R. Bagenstos, "Rational Discrimination, "
Accommodation, and the Politics of (Disability) Civil Rights, 89 VA. L. REV. 825, 910
(2003).
80 See Arnow-Richman, supra note 10, at 369-73 (describing how courts confuse the
FMLA retaliation and interference provisions and mistakenly place the burden of proof on
plaintiffs refused reinstatement to prove adverse motive); Martin H. Malin, Interference
with the Right to Leave Under the Family and Medical Leave, 7 EMPLOYEE RTS. & EMP.
POL'Y J 329, 358-63 (2003) (describing how courts have falsely dichotomized FMLA
retaliation and interference through a misunderstanding of statutory language, resulting in a
mistaken analogy between denial of reinstatement and Title VII discrimination claims).
81 See Sara Schaefer Mufioz, A Good Idea, but... : Some Businesses Complain that
the Family and Medical Leave Act Should Be More Aptly Named the Slackers Protection
Act, WALL ST. J., Jan. 24, 2005, at R6.
82 For a detailed description of these labor market trends, see generally PETER
CAPPELLI, THE NEW DEAL AT WORK: MANAGING THE MARKET-DRIVEN WORKFORCE 59-
64 (1999); Rachel Amow-Richman, Bargaining for Loyalty in the Information Age. A
Reconsideration of the Role of Substantive Fairness in Enforcing Employee Noncompetes,
80 OR. L. REV. 1163, 1198-1202 (2000); Katherine V.W. Stone, The New Psychological
Contract: Implications of the Changing Workplace for Labor and Employment Law, 48
UCLA L. REV. 519,533 (2001).
83 See Arnow-Richman, supra note 10, at 383 ("[W]ith the demise of the reciprocal
social contract of employment, employers are less inclined to view employment
relationships as permanent and have only limited incentive to invest in the long-term
productivity of individual workers.").
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addition, such initiatives, if successfully pursued, could prove helpful to some
caregivers, such as those who require FMLA leave but cannot afford to take it, or
those who are able to continue working but are unfairly judged as a result of latent
biases. Yet such initiatives are also limited. They build largely on traditional
legislative responses to status discrimination-the anti-discrimination model of
Title VII and the accommodation model of the ADA, both of which are top-down
approaches grounded in substantive legal rights. For this reason, they are likely to
fall victim to the problems that plague existing legislation-narrow judicial
interpretation of discrimination laws, societal skepticism about the costs and
"preferences" associated with accommodation, and, in the case of enhanced
benefits initiatives, the inability of specific rules to address the divergent needs and
circumstances of all caregivers. It is therefore critical that scholars and advocates
devise a viable alternative course of action to supplement the expansion of existing
discrimination and family leave law.
III. THE ORGANIZATIONAL JUSTICE ALTERNATIVE:
PRIVATE PRACTICES UNDER PUBLIC SCRUTINY
Fortunately, a growing trend within discrimination law offers a starting point
for an alternative initiative. Increasingly, courts are looking at an employer's
responsiveness to the needs of historically excluded workers in interpreting the
commands of existing discrimination laws. Thus, under the landmark Supreme
Court decisions in Burlington Industries v. Ellerth84 and Faragher v. Boca Raton,8 5
employers can assert a defense to sexual harassment hostile work environment
liability based on preventative and corrective conduct. 86 Elsewhere, under the
ADA, some circuit courts have examined the process by which employers respond
to accommodation requests by disabled workers in assessing liability in
substantive failure to accommodate claims. 87 The former development has touched
off a wave of scholarly literature emphasizing the importance of what happens
inside firms in ultimately achieving the transformative potential of anti-
discrimination law and elaborating on how to harness and encourage proactive
behavior by employers.88
The result is what I call the "incentivized organizational justice" approach to
second-generation exclusion. By use of the term "organizational justice," I refer to
approaches that leverage legal rules to encourage proactive personnel practices, in
particular employer-administered policies for soliciting and responding to the
requests of non-traditional employees. As this definition suggests, the belief that
underlies such an approach is that employers must play an affirmative role in
84 524 U.S. 742 (1998).
85 524 U.S. 775 (1998).
86 See id. at 807; Ellerth, 524 U.S. at 764; infra Part III.A. I.
87 See, e.g., Barnett v. U.S. Air, Inc., 228 F.3d 1105, 1116 (9th Cir. 2000); see infra
Part III.A.2.
88 See, e.g., Estlund, supra note 14, at 378-83; Sturm, supra note 1, at 491-520; see
infra Part IV.A.
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eliminating disparities in employment quality in order for any legislative effort to
be successful. In the section that follows, I provide two practical illustrations of
how such approaches have worked and how they can be strengthened, before
turning to how these ideas can be adapted in the context of caregiver exclusion. In
so doing, I will expose what I consider to be the three key characteristics of
incentivized organizational justice: a focus on the organic internal practices of
companies as opposed to externally constructed standards of conduct, the use of
monetary penalties and liability presumptions to provide incentive for inclusive
behavior by employers, and a move away from intent to harm toward an
assessment of preventative and responsive action in determining fault and
consequently liability.
A. Judicial Adoption of Organizational Justice Principles:
Risks and Potential
1. Vicarious Liability for Supervisory Sexual Harassment
The most visible move to consider employers' internal procedures in anti-
discrimination law is the development of the Ellerth/Faragher affirmative defense
to hostile work environment liability. Under this defense, employers will be
relieved of liability for harassing behavior that does not culminate in a tangible
employment action if they can show, among other things, that they engaged in
preventative and corrective measures to avoid harassment.89
The Supreme Court established the affirmative defense in a pair of cases
addressing the availability of vicarious liability for hostile work environment
harassment. 90 Unlike traditional quid pro quo harassment, in which the employer
exercises its discretion to affect the employee's status at work, hostile work
environment harassment can occur absent employer support or even awareness. In
light of this, the Court concluded the employer should be held responsible in those
cases where it aided the harasser by failing to prevent or correct such behavior.9'
Specifically, the Court held that an employer would not be liable where it could
prove: (1) the employer exercised reasonable care to prevent and correct promptly
any sexually harassing behavior; and (2) the employee unreasonably failed to take
advantage of any preventative or corrective opportunities provided by the
employer, or otherwise avoid harm.92
Although the Court's analysis was grounded in basic agency principles,
93
many aspects of its decision are consistent with an organizational justice approach
to equal employment quality. An ideal interpretation and application of the
affirmative defense looks to the employer's voluntary policies and practices in
89 See Faragher, 524 U.S. at 807; Ellerth, 524 U.S. at 764.
90 See Faragher, 524 U.S. at 807; Ellerth, 524 U.S. at 764.
91 See Faragher, 524 U.S. at 808-09; Ellerth, 524 U.S. at 758-59.
92 See Faragher, 524 U.S. at 807; Ellerth, 524 U.S. at 765.
93 See Faragher, 524 U.S. at 783-94; Ellerth, 524 U.S. at 754-60.
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assessing liability, thus tying fault to the absence of positive, proactive behavior
rather than the presence of affirmative misconduct. 94 The question is whether the
employer has enabled discriminatory behavior and/or discriminatory results
through its inaction. In this way, in theory, it provides incentive for more
conscientious behavior by employers.
In operation, however, the defense has become a lightening rod for criticism.
The general consensus, as well as the conclusion of some empirical data, is that
plaintiffs lose under the new standard. 95 One reason for this is courts' apparent
willingness to conclude that a company that maintains and disseminates a sexual
harassment policy satisfies the first prong of the defense.96 This conclusion is
problematic in two respects. First, it assumes without question that a paper policy
and related human resources measures, such as training, are effective responses to
sexual harassment.97 Second, it may preclude court consideration of what are
arguably more relevant and situationally specific matters such as the extent the
employer actively polices hostility in the workplace and the employer's
responsiveness to the particular complaint.98 The feared result is a culture of "paper
94 See Faragher, 524 U.S. at 808-09 (holding as a matter of law that the defendant
city could not have been found to have acted with reasonable care because it "had entirely
failed to disseminate its policy against sexual harassment among the beach employees
and.., its officials made no attempt to keep track of the conduct of [its] supervisors").
95 See Stephen F. Befort & Sarah J. Gorajsk, When Quitting is Fitting: The Need for a
Reformulated Sexual Harassment/Constructive Discharge Standard in the Wake of
Pennsylvania State Police v. Suders, 67 OHIO ST. L.J. 593, 641-42 (2006); Susan Bisom-
Rapp, An Ounce of Prevention Is a Poor Substitute for a Pound of Cure: Confronting the
Developing Jurisprudence of Education and Prevention in Employment Discrimination
Law, 22 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 1 (2001); Ann Lawton, Operating in an Empirical
Vacuum: The Ellerth and Faragher Affirmative Defense, 13 COLUM. J. GENDER & L. 197
(2004); John H. Marks, Smoke, Mirrors, and the Disappearance of "Vicarious" Liability:
The Emergence of a Dubious Summary-Judgment Safe Harbor for Employers Whose
Supervisory Personnel Commit Hostile Environment Workplace Harassment, 38 HOUS. L.
REV. 1401 (2002).
96 See Samuel R. Bagenstos, The Structural Turn and the Limits ofAntidiscrimination
Law, 94 CAL. L. REV. 1, 25 (2006) (describing judicial unwillingness to engage in rigorous
scrutiny of employer procedures despite Supreme Court precedent); David Sherwyn et al.,
Don't Train Your Employees and Cancel Your "1-800 " Harassment Hotline: An Empirical
Examination and Correction of the Flaws in the Affirmative Defense to Sexual Harassment
Charges, 69 FORDHAM L. REV. 1265, 1283-85 (2001) (finding the existence of a sexual
harassment policy to be the only factor to statistically predict an award of summary
judgment in an employer's favor).
97 See Lawton, supra note 95, at 198, 207, 212, 222 (arguing that empirical evidence
of the effectiveness of employer policies is lacking); Margaret S. Stockdale et al., Coming
to Terms with Zero Tolerance Sexual Harassment Policies, 4 J. FORENSIC PSYCHOL. PRAC.
65, 73-74 (2004) (explaining that organizational climates are not formed on the basis of
written rules).
98 See Stockdale et al., supra note 97, at 72 (finding in a study of courts' treatment of
zero tolerance polices that courts paid little attention to effectiveness and overall workplace
culture in assessing liability).
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compliance" 99 that may ultimately lower the bar on what employers need to do to
avoid liability.'00
Certainly this aspect of the affirmative defense experiment should give us
pause before adopting other organizational justice approaches to discrimination
liability. However, it should not bring the trend to a full stop. A few courts have
understood the defense and gotten the results right. These courts have denied
summary judgment to employers invoking the defense, leaving it to the jury to
assess the quality of the employer's policies and its response to the particular
incident.' 0 ' While this interpretation is not as prevalent as one would hope, it at
least demonstrates the potential for a rigorous factual inquiry into employer
conduct.
The gap between potential and reality in many Ellerth/Faragher cases can be
explained by at least two facts: the defense is entirely judicial in source, and it
reflects a latent policy choice on which there appears to be vast disagreement. With
respect to the first point, the Supreme Court's articulation of the defense lacks
precision and is couched in dicta that invite the paper-focused interpretation of the
lower courts. The Court frames its holding as a two-prong defense, with the first
prong focusing on the employer's policies and conduct, and the second focusing on
the conduct of the victim.10 2 In reality, the first prong contains two necessary sub-
elements-the employer must exercise reasonable care to prevent and correct
harassment. 10 3 The existence of a sexual harassment policy may demonstrate
efforts to prevent harassment, but it does not speak to the quality of the employer's
corrective action. Yet in Ellerth and Faragher, the Court goes on to discuss
harassment policies as an example of facts relevant to the inquiry to be conducted
under the first prong.104 Many lower courts appear to have taken that dictum to
99 Samuel R. Bagenstos, The Structural Turn, supra note 96 at 24; see also Stockdale
et al., supra note 97, at 72 (warning of the likelihood of symbolic compliance by
employers).
100 Concern over a dilution in liability standards is informed by the theory of legal
endogeneity, which suggests that regulated actors not only respond to legal directives, but
in so doing shape the development of the law. See Lauren B. Edelman, The Endogeneity of
Legal Regulation: Grievance Procedures as Rational Myths, 105 AMER. J. OF Soc. 406,
407 (1999). As applied in this context, the theory would suggest that the policies and
procedures adopted by employers in response to the preventative action component of the
Supreme Court's affirmative defense will form a baseline that courts will use in evaluating
compliance efforts.
10' See, e.g., Wells v. Happy Tymes Family Fun Ctr., Inc., No. 04-5354, 2005 WL
3111783, at *2 (E.D. Pa. Nov. 21, 2005); Dowling v. Home Depot, No. 02-3181, 2003 WL
40741, at *3 (E.D Pa. Jan. 2, 2003).
102 See Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, 524 U.S. 775, 807 (1998) ("The [affirmative]
defense [to liability] comprises two necessary elements."); Burlington Indus., Inc. v.
Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742, 765 (1998) (same).
103 Ellerth, 524 U.S. at 765 ("[The first prong is] that the employer exercised
reasonable care to prevent and correct promptly any sexually harassing behavior.").
104 See Faragher, 524 U.S. at 807-08; Ellerth, 524 U.S. at 765 ("While proof that an
employer had promulgated an anti-harassment policy with complaint procedure is not
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heart, placing undue emphasis on that single aspect of the prevention sub-element
of first prong of the test. Thus, the Court's choice of example, combined with its
failure to segregate what implicitly are two separate requirements, has contributed
to a misinterpretation by lower courts that emphasizes prevention at the expense of
a more fact-intensive inquiry into corrective action.
Second, any incentive to paper compliance is exacerbated by the Supreme
Court's suggestion that where both employer and employee are equally blameless,
vicarious liability attaches. A common harassment scenario involves an employer
that makes reasonable efforts to prevent harassment, the occurrence of a harassing
event notwithstanding those efforts, a timely complaint by the victim, followed by
reasonable corrective action by the employer. In this situation, the employer has
done no wrong, but remains vicariously liable; whenever a victim timely reports,
the employer is unable to establish the second prong of the affirmative defense,
that the plaintiff "unreasonably failed to take advantage of any preventative or
corrective opportunities" of the employer. 0 5 Presumably the Supreme Court
intended that result insofar as it made the two prongs of its test conjunctive.10 6
However the particular factual scenario was not before it: in both Ellerth and
Faragher the victim delayed reporting until after she left employment and the
employer's preventative efforts were less than ideal. 10 7 This has allowed some
lower courts, sheepish about assigning liability to blameless employers, to
distinguish Ellerth and Faragher and award summary judgment notwithstanding
the instructions of the Court. 1
08
Of course, the underlying question as to who should bear the loss between
two innocents is an important and controversial question, but not one that will be
resolved in this Article.'0 9 The point, rather, is to understand why judicial
necessary in every instance as a matter of law, the need for a stated policy suitable to the
employment circumstances may appropriately be addressed in any case when litigating the
first element of the defense.").
105 Faragher, 524 U.S. at 807; Ellerth, 524 U.S. at 765.
106 See Faragher, 524 U.S. at 797 (citing a tort treatise stating "'the integrating
principle' of respondeat superior is 'that the employer should be liable for those faults that
may be fairly regarded as risks of his business, whether they are committed in furthering it
or not' (citations omitted)); Ellerth, 524 U.S. at 758 (noting that, in limited circumstances,
"agency principles impose liability on employers even where employees commit torts
outside the scope of employment").
107 See Faragher, 524 U.S. at 782 (noting that the defendant "completely failed to
disseminate its policy among employees of the Marine Safety Section, with the result that
[members of the Plaintiffs work group] were unaware of it"); Ellerth, 524 U.S. at 748
(noting that the plaintiff first complained of behavior in a letter of explanation three weeks
after quitting).
108 See Marks, supra note 95, at 1423 (critiquing courts' response to "rapid onset
harassment").
109 On this issue, see generally Seth D. Harris, Innocence and the Sopranos, 49 NEW
YoRK L. SCH. L. REv. 577 (2004-05) (questioning the definition of innocence as
understood by courts and its ultimate relevance to the project of redressing workplace
discrimination).
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application of the affirmative defense has been a disappointment to some
commentators in order to clarify its significance to future organizational justice
approaches to liability. What should be clear is that a rule that attaches liability to a
faultless employer is not applying organizational justice principles at all; it is
asserting a normative judgment that it is better to charge a blameless employer
than allow an innocent victim to go uncompensated. Indeed, in some respects the
Ellerth/Faragher defense actually discourages the type of proactive behavior that
the organizational justice model seeks to reward and encourages symbolic
compliance. Since an employer will be liable whenever an employee properly
reports, it is arguably in its interest to engage in preventative measures that
technically satisfy the first prong of the defense, but which fall short of creating a
work climate that truly encourages employees to come forward. 10
Thus, the Ellerth/Faragher defense, while problematic in some applications,
certainly should not be taken as a general referendum on the viability of further
organizational justice approaches to discrimination liability. Future legislative or
Supreme Court action can save the harassment defense by clarifying the
relationship between the two sub-elements of the first prong of the defense and re-
emphasizing the need for the type of fact-intensive inquiry that generally requires
jury deliberation. More importantly, the organizational justice component of the
defense is limited to its first prong, which requires employers to engage in
preventative and corrective action. To the extent that principle is intertwined with
what is effectively a strict liability mandate in the second prong of the defense, it
does not provide a reliable example of the value and potential of a pure
organizational justice approach to liability.
2. "Interactive Process" Obligations Under the ADA
A less noted, but arguably more successful, example of an organizational
justice approach to employment discrimination liability is judicial consideration of
employer/employee cooperation in assessing liability for failure to accommodate
disabled workers under the ADA. Several circuits have held that the ADA requires
employers who have reason to know of an employee's disability to engage in an
"interactive process" with that individual,"' and emphasis on the development of
such a process is a core part of the legal and human resources compliance
literature. ' 12
110 See Sherwyn et al., supra note 96, at 1280-84 (arguing that the affirmative defense
creates perverse incentives to discourage reporting, and recommending elimination of the
second prong of the defense).
111 See, e.g., Barnett v. U.S. Air, Inc., 228 F.3d 1105, 1116 (9th Cir. 2000); Bartee v.
Michelin N. Am., Inc., 374 F.3d 906, 916 (10th Cir. 2004); Beck v. Univ. of Wis. Bd. of
Regents, 75 F.3d 1130, 1135 (7th Cir. 1996); Jamison v. Dow Chem. Co., 354 F. Supp. 2d
715, 733 (E.D. Mich. 2004); Picinich v. United Parcel Serv., 321 F. Supp. 2d 485, 511
(N.D.N.Y. 2004).
112 See, e.g., Stephen F. Befort, Accommodation at Work: Lessons from the Americans
with Disabilities Act and Possibilities for Alleviating the American Worker Time Crunch,
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The idea of constructive interaction between employers and employees as a
means of achieving accommodation stems from Equal Employment Opportunity
Commission ("EEOC") interpretative regulations to the ADA. These provide that
in order to determine whether an employee is entitled to an accommodation "it
may be necessary for the [employer] to initiate an informal, interactive process"
with that individual. 1 3 The purpose of the process is to "identify the precise
limitations resulting from the disability and potential reasonable accommodations
that could overcome [them]." ' 1 4 Despite the permissive language of the regulation,
most courts have held that employers have an affirmative duty to engage in the
interactive process. The obligation is triggered either by the employee's request for
accommodation, or, in situations where the employee's disability or need for
accommodation is apparent, the employer's actual or constructive knowledge of
the situation. 115
13 CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 615, 622-28 (2004) (describing the "procedural
revolution" under the ADA); Hope A. Comisky, Guidelines for Successfully Engaging in
the Interactive Process to Find a Reasonable Accommodation Under the Americans with
Disabilities Act, 13 LAB. LAW. 499, 502-09 (1998) (discussing the steps an employer
should take to ensure compliance with the interactive process); PollyBeth Proctor,
Determining 'Reasonable Accommodation' Under the ADA: Understanding Employer and
Employee Rights and Obligations During the Interactive Process, 33 Sw. U. L. REv. 51,
55-72 (2003) (surveying the circuit courts' varying treatments of the interactive process
requirement for reasonable accommodations in the employment context under Title I of the
ADA); Stanley J. Smits, Disability and Employment in the USA: The Quest for Best
Practices, 19 DISABILITY & Soc'Y 647, 658 (2004) (determining that employers engage in
the best employment practices in the disability arena when "(a) service providers and
persons with disabilities have employment as a convergent priority; (b) investments in
public awareness create a climate for collaboration and systems integration; and (c) when
employers are brought on-board and get involved at a personal level").
"' 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(o)(3) (2006).
114id.
115 See Conneen v. MBNA Am. Bank, N.A., 334 F.3d 318, 332 (3d Cir. 2003)
("[C]ircumstances will sometimes require '[t]he employer ... to meet the employee half-
way, and if it appears that the employee may need an accommodation but doesn't know
how to ask for it, the employer should do what it can to help."' (quoting Bultemeyer v. Fort
Wayne Cmty. Sch., 100 F.3d 1281, 1285 (7th Cir. 1996) (alteration in original))); Barnett,
228 F.3d at 1114 ("[I]f the company knows of the existence of the employee's disability,
the employer must assist in initiating the interactive process."); Smith v. Midland Brake,
Inc., 180 F.3d 1154, 1172 (10th Cir. 1999) (stating that "expressing a desire for
reassignment" to a different position within the company need not include any magic
words; rather, "the employee must convey to the employer a desire to remain with the
company despite his or her disability"); Nagel v. Sykes Enters., Inc., 383 F. Supp. 2d 1180,
1192 (D.N.D. 2005) ("'A request for accommodation, while it need not contain any magic
words, must be sufficient to convey to the employer that the employee is requesting that his
disability be accommodated."' (quoting Lowery v. Hazelwood Sch. Dist., 244 F.3d 654,
660 (8th Cir. 2001))); Mihalko v. Potter, No. 00-2076, 2003 WL 23319594, at *12 (W.D.
Pa. 2003) ("[N]otice need not be in writing, be made by the employee himself, or formally
invoke the magic words reasonable accommodation, the notice nonetheless must make
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Underlying the obligation is the belief that process is necessary for parties to
reach appropriate solutions to the work limitations posed by a disability,
recognizing that neither employers nor employees can find optimal
accommodations on their own. Employees do not know the range of possible
positions or job adaptations that may be available within the organization." 6
Similarly, employers do not have expertise in the nature of the employee's
disability and cannot know what kinds of job alterations would be helpful." 7 By
focusing the parties toward achieving a joint result, the interactive process steps
outside the zero-sum game associated with mandated-benefit legislation.
In application, courts must examine the quality of the parties' interaction,
assess the good faith of each side, and determine who is responsible for the failure
to achieve an accommodation." 8 For instance, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals
in Barnett v. U.S. Air, Inc., found U.S. Air liable for a breakdown in the interactive
process surrounding a disabled customer service agent's request to remain in a
mailroom position as an accommodation. 19 Upon injuring his back in a cargo
position, the plaintiff used seniority rights to transfer to a mailroom position.
120
Later, when he learned that more senior employees who planned to transfer to the
mailroom might bump him back to cargo, he requested permission to remain in the
mailroom as a reasonable accommodation.'
2
'
clear that the employee wants assistance for his or her disability."' (quoting Jones v.
United Parcel Serv., 214 F.3d 402, 408 (3d Cir. 2000) (internal quotation marks omitted))).
116 See Barnett, 228 F.3d at 1113 (noting that exploring accommodations for an
employee requires participation of the employer because he or she has "superior knowledge
regarding the range of possible positions and can more easily perform analyses regarding
the 'essential functions' of each" (quoting Taylor v. Phoenixville Sch. Dist., 184 F.3d 296,
316 (3d Cir. 1999))); cf Smith, 180 F.3d at 1173 ("[I]n a small company an employee
might be reasonably expected to know what other jobs are available for which he or she
may be qualified to perform. [sic] On the other hand, in larger companies or companies
where the employee does not have ready access to information regarding available jobs, it
might be reasonable to require the employer to identify jobs that the employer reasonably
concludes are appropriate for reassignment consideration.").
117 See Barnett, 228 F.3d at 1113 ("[T]he employee holds essential information for the
assessment of the type of reasonable accommodation which would be most effective ....
[E]mployees generally know more about their own capabilities and limitations.").
118 See EEOC v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 417 F.3d 789, 805 (7th Cir. 2005) (explaining
that no hard and fast rule exists to determine which party was responsible for the
breakdown in the process; rather courts that address this issue should "isolate the cause of
the breakdown and then assign responsibility"); Beck v. Univ. of Wis. Bd. of Regents, 75
F.3d 1130, 1135 (7th Cir. 1996) ("[N]either party should be able to cause a breakdown in
the process for the purpose of either avoiding or inflicting liability. Rather, courts should
look for signs of failure to participate in good faith or failure by one of the parties to make
reasonable efforts to help the other party determine what specific accommodations are
necessary.").
"9 228 F.3d at 1122.
121 Id.
"' Id. at 1108-09.
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On the question whether the employer violated the ADA interactive process
requirement, the Ninth Circuit evaluated the company's response and found it
wanting. 22 U.S. Air did not reply to Barnett for five months, at which point the
response consisted of a supervisor informing Barnett that he would be placed on
involuntary job injury leave.' 23 The employer did not engage in any substantive
discussion of Barnett's condition, the kinds of limitations that it imposed, or what
could be done to accommodate him. 24 Following this meeting, Barnett sent a
second letter proposing two alternative accommodations within the cargo position:
that the employer purchase a type of lifting device or restructure the position so he
would do only warehouse office work. 25 Both of these requests were also denied,
by letter, with instructions that Barnett could bid for jobs "within his
restrictions." 26
Ultimately, the Supreme Court determined on appeal that Barnett's proposal
to remain in the mailman was not reasonable because it would have violated other
workers' seniority rights. 127 However, the Court did not certify for review the
independent part of the Ninth Circuit decision addressing the process by which the
employer decided to refuse the accommodation. 28 Thus, it left standing the ruling
that U.S. Air had failed to fulfill a mandatory obligation under the ADA and that
statutory liability "would be appropriate if a reasonable accommodation would
otherwise have been possible."'
129
A better approach to handling employee requests for accommodation can be
seen in Beck v. University of Wisconsin Board of Regents. 130 In that case a
secretary suffering from osteoporosis and depression made several requests for
accommodation, many of which were granted.13 ' Importantly, on Beck's return
122 Id. at 1108.
123 Id. at 1117.
124 Id. at 1109.
125 id.
126 Id.
127 See US Airways, Inc. v. Barnett, 535 U.S. 391, 403-05 (2002) (discussing the
importance of preserving seniority rights to ensure strong employee-management relations
where the system fulfills expectations of uniform and fair treatment), vacating U.S. Air,
Inc., v. Barnett, 228 F.3d 1105 (9th Cir. 2000).
128 US Airways, Inc. v. Barnett, 532 U.S. 970 (No. 00-1250) (April 16, 2001)
(granting certiorari to the Ninth Circuit "limited to Question I presented by the petition");
Petition for a Writ of Certiorari at i, 2001 WL 34091942 (posing the following questions:
"1. Whether... the ADA requires an employer to reassign a disabled employee to a
different position as a 'reasonable accommodation' even though another employee is
entitled to hold the position under the employer's bona fide and established seniority
system .... 2. Whether... evidence of an employer's failure to engage in an interactive
process with a disabled employee to identify reasonable accommodations precludes the
employer from obtaining summary judgment in an ADA action").
129 Barnett, 228 F.3d at 1117.
130 75 F.3d 1130, 1132 (7th Cir. 1996).
131 The employer attempted to accommodate Beck by providing a wrist rest, a reduced
workload, office relocation, and medical leave. Id.
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from medical leave, the University made an effort to determine what Beck needed
in order to perform her job-it scheduled a meeting with her, requested that she
provide medical information from her physician, and asked her by memo to
provide more details about her disability and how she needed to be
accommodated. 132 Similarly, in Jamison v. Dow Chemical Co., an engineer
technician in a chemical plant developed an eye condition that prevented him from
working near dust, fumes, and vapors. 3 3 After some initial efforts to accommodate
him within his building (for instance, by providing protective eye gear), Jamison
was referred to an in-house training resource responsible for repurposing company
employees for a variety of reasons including medical restrictions. 134 The head of
the training resource program implemented his procedure for handling such
referrals, which consisted of gathering information about the worker's medical
restrictions, informing production leaders about the availability of particular
medically restricted personnel, and following up with those individuals to find out
about possible staffing needs.' 35 He placed Jamison in at least five positions before
reaching the conclusion that work in a chemical plant in any capacity was
incompatible with the employee's condition. 3 6
Obviously it is better for employees if employers take the approach to
accommodation adopted by the University of Wisconsin and Dow Chemicals than
U.S. Air's approach. The question is: what role does the law play in encouraging
that behavior? Certainly the reasonable accommodation requirement creates an
incentive to engage in some type of process even absent a legal requirement to do
so, and indeed employers have been doing so for some time. Yet it is also possible
to imagine tying penalties or other substantive legal consequences to procedural
violations so that procedural obligations provide meaningful incentives in their
own right.
For instance, while most courts have held that liability ensues for failure to
engage in an interactive process only if a reasonable accommodation would have
been available, 137 several have taken account of the procedural requirement in
ruling on summary judgment. These courts have held that evidence of the
employer's failure to engage in an interactive process precludes an award of
132 Beck never responded to this request, nor did she provide the necessary
information and, after an extended period of trial and error with different work
arrangements, she was terminated. Id. at 1133.
133 Jamison v. Dow Chem. Co., 354 F. Supp. 2d 715, 719 (E.D. Mich. 2004).
134 Id. at 722.
135 id.
'
36 Id. at 725.
137 See, e.g., Barnett v. U.S. Air, Inc., 228 F.3d 1105, 1116 (9th Cir. 2000); Taylor v.
Phoenixville Sch. Dist., 184 F.3d 296, 317-18 (3d Cir. 1999); Smith v. Midland Brake,
Inc., 180 F.3d 1154, 1174 (10th Cir. 1999); Bultemeyer v. Fort Wayne Cmty. Sch., 100
F.3d 1281, 1285 (7th Cir. 1996); Taylor v. Principal Fin. Group, Inc., 93 F.3d 155, 165 (5th
Cir. 1996).
[No. I
HeinOnline  -- 2007 Utah L. Rev. 54 2007
2007] EQUAL EMPLOYMENT QUALITY FOR CAREGIVERS 55
summary judgment on the plaintiffs substantive failure to accommodate claim. 138
This approach has its difficulties. Indeed, it seems problematic to suggest that
summary judgment should be denied automatically on the basis of a process failure
where the plaintiff does not have the facts necessary to sustain a substantive claim.
For instance, given the prevailing interpretation of reasonable accommodation, if
an employer flatly denies without any consideration a disabled employee's request
to work reduced hours, it would be futile to require a trial in the face of evidence
that all employees in the plaintiffs position work full-time and the employer has
previously denied reduced time for non-disabled individuals.
39
That said, the underlying motivation for the approach is the notion that
proactive employer behavior is an integral part of achieving equal employment
quality for non-traditional workers. By denying summary judgment on the
accommodation claim, courts put the quality of worker due process at the center of
the substantive inquiry under the statute. The implication is that what might at first
seem an untenable conflict between the needs of a worker and the needs of the
business may in fact be reconcilable if only the parties can educate each other
through an objective process. If courts operate under this assumption, and can
succeed in creating effective and administrable litigation incentives, they may
realize the full potential of an organizational justice approach, one that not only
rewards good behavior, but targets exclusion at its source-the extant managerial
and operational procedures that have been developed and shaped by mainstream
workers over the years without the input of non-traditional employees. By
advantaging those employers that engage with their workforce, courts can value
and encourage the development of cultures of inclusion that may help erode
organizational barriers to success.
Perhaps most importantly, judicial attention to employer behavior is emerging
despite courts' limited interpretation of the scope of the substantive rights created
by the ADA. Arguably the most aggressive of the federal equal employment
opportunity laws, the ADA's accommodation mandate has often been criticized for
failing to achieve significant changes in work structure. 140 At the same time there
is research to suggest that whatever the statistics on the success of such claims or
the scope of the accommodation mandate, the ADA has had a significant impact on
the perception of disabled workers and their ability to have a voice in the
workplace.' 4' The interactive process jurisprudence suggests one way in which the
138 See, e.g., Fjellestad v. Pizza Hut of Am., Inc., 188 F.3d 944, 953 (8th Cir. 1999);
Phoenixville Sch. Dist., 184 F.3d at 318; see generally Befort, supra note 112 , at 627-28
(explaining competing judicial approaches to the consequences of an interactive process
violation).
139 See, e.g., Davis v. Microsoft Corp., 37 P.3d 333, 335 (Wash. Ct. App. 2002).
140 See, e.g., Arnow-Richman, supra note 10, at 363-67; Travis, supra note 5, at 6.
141 See, e.g., DAVID M. ENGEL & FRANK W. MUNGEL, RIGHTS OF INCLUSION: LAW
AND IDENTITY IN THE LIFE STORIES OF AMERICANS WITH DISABILITIES 243-44 (2003)
(concluding that ADA rights become "active" through their influence on personal identity
of disabled persons, cultural and discursive shifts, and institutional transformations
regardless of whether disabled individuals explicitly invoke legal rights); Befort, supra
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law creates that effect. Although courts may be uncomfortable compelling
employers to alter their work practices, they are willing to penalize those who do
not make an effort to accommodate. Thus, there is reason to believe that the ADA
is giving disabled workers a leg up in negotiating with their employers and, as a
consequence, is achieving favorable, cooperatively designed solutions under the
radar of reported case law.
B. Organizational Justice for Caregivers:
Procedural Rights Plus Incentivized Accommodation
Having surveyed recent organizational justice moves in other areas of
discrimination law, this subsection turns to harnessing the potential of incentivized
organizational justice to achieve positive results for caregivers while studiously
avoiding some of its pitfalls. It puts forth a two-part proposal consisting of a
legislative amendment to the FMLA and a reinterpretation of the burden of proof
on FMLA and Title VII claims. Specifically, it calls first for an added provision to
the FMLA that would require employers to engage in a good-faith interactive
process with workers, both when the need for leave arises and when affected
workers return to work, or face a monetary penalty. Second, it argues for a
judicially created burden shift on proof of substantive violations of the FMLA and
Title VII in cases where employers fail to engage in a good-faith process and the
plaintiff can demonstrate a prima facie case of retaliation or discriminatory failure
to accommodate. The first component adopts the ADA interactive process concept,
but makes the threat of a procedural violation meaningful through the imposition
of a statutory fee. The second component draws on the first prong of the
Ellerth/Faragher defense, but makes clear that avoiding a burden shift turns on the
quality of the employer's response to the particular accommodation request rather
than general compliance efforts.
1. Statutory Damages for Procedural Violations
A simple and potentially fruitful change to the statutory cannon can be
achieved by amending the FMLA to include an interactive process requirement
similar to that which exists under the ADA. In addition to providing twelve weeks
of unpaid leave, the Act could require employers to engage in a good-faith,
interactive process with qualifying employees to consider ways of altering their
work schedules (or work requirements) to effect a needed accommodation. At a
minimum this procedural obligation would be triggered in two circumstances:
note 112, at 626 (asserting that although "the accommodation model may not have
produced a revolution in the substantive law arena .... the interactive process contemplated
by the ADA ... has launched untold numbers of successful workplace accommodations").
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when an employee experiences a qualifying caregiving-related event or when an
employee returns from FMLA leave taken for such purposes.
42
Such an approach represents an initial step toward addressing what is perhaps
the strongest criticism of the FMLA: that the Act is event-centered, treating birth,
adoption and family illness as discrete moments rather than life-long experiences.
A procedural requirement imposed on the employer upon the conclusion of FMLA
leave recognizes, for instance, that an employee who gives birth or adopts a new
child cannot be expected to seamlessly return to full-time work upon the
conclusion of the child's third month. 143 Rather, such a law supposes that any time
a qualifying event occurs, additional accommodations beyond leave may well be
necessary and can potentially be achieved through mutual agreement where parties
meet in a meaningful attempt to assess the employee's situation and any limitations
that he or she might face upon returning to work.
Similarly, an interactive process can refine, in some situations, the blunt effect
of a one-size-fits-all mandated benefit. By engaging in a good-faith process at the
onset of a qualifying event, parties may be able to identify alternative
accommodations that are more closely tailored to the employee's situation and just
as viable for the employer. For instance, there may be situations in which a
relatively simple job modification will enable a pregnant employee to continue
working and allow the employer to avoid the disruption of a temporary
replacement. It may also be possible to work out a flexible schedule that enables an
employee caring for a seriously ill family member to maintain close to full-time
142 Because this Article deals specifically with challenges faced by working
caregivers, my proposal focuses on employees eligible for FMLA leave based on birth,
adoption, pregnancy, or the serious health condition of a family member. I note, however,
that because a process amendment does not create any additional substantive rights, there
would appear to be little harm in including within the mandate employees experiencing
their own serious health conditions other than pregnancy. Similarly, it may be possible to
apply this limited procedural component to a broader group of working caregivers than
those who are FMLA-eligible. For instance, one might require the employer to engage in
the interactive process with workers who experience caregiving conflicts that do not trigger
FMLA leave, such as a non-serious illness of a family member. Also, it might be
appropriate to place this obligation on all employers, not only those that meet the FMLA
requirement of employing fifty or more workers, given that the provision would impose
only the negligible costs and burdens of engaging in the process itself, without requiring
those employers to supply the twelve-week leave. A thorough consideration of whether
procedural rights would be appropriate or effective in those situations, however, is a topic
beyond the scope of this Article.
143 See Deborah L. Rhode, Response Essay: Balanced Lives, 102 COLUM. L. .REv..
834, 845 (2002) (noting that "twelve weeks falls short of what child development experts
believe is minimally necessary" for the amount of time a mother should remain at home
with her child after birth ); Joan Williams, Our Economy of Mothers and Others: Women
and Economics Revisited, 5 J. GENDER RACE & JUST.. 411, 430 (2002) (critiquing the
FMLA for "account[ing] for only three months of child-rearing, a task that lasts twenty
years").
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employment and avoid the administrative difficulties associated with the use of
intermittent leave.
Of course, the right described here would be limited to the right to request and
discuss; it would not compel the employer to accommodate the worker, but merely
facilitate voluntary solutions. This is critical to the political viability of the
proposal both in terms of congressional adoption and the reliability of judicial
enforcement. By the same token, the absence of an underlying substantive right to
accommodation means that care must be taken to ensure employer accountability
under the amendment. The worker's procedural rights must be enforced by a
monetary penalty sufficient to deter noncompliance. 44 One possibility, for
instance, would be to require liquidated damages equivalent to twice the
employee's pay for the twelve-week FMLA leave period. In addition, violations
must include not only blatant failures to meet and discuss, but also the failure to act
in good faith, as where an employer implements a process in name only and gives
no meaningful consideration to the employee's request. 145 The effect of any
remedial scheme could be enhanced by making the denials publicly available
through a government or industry publication that would have reputational
consequences for the employer.
2. Litigation Penalties for Failure to Act in Good Faith
As a further incentive, an employer's procedural failures could result in a
presumption of employer liability on certain substantive claims under the FMLA
and Title VII. While similar to the idea underlying the denial of summary
judgment for interactive process violators under the ADA, the litigation penalty
would take the form of a judicially created shift in the burden of proof4 46 on FMLA
retaliation claims and Title VII discriminatory failure to accommodate claims.147 In
144 Since the employee has no right to accommodation, the damages should not be
based on any loss of work or denial of a particular accommodation.
145 The invocation of good faith in this context calls to mind the employer's obligation
to bargain in good faith with a union representative. While that body of law may be the
most obvious analogy for this inquiry, it would not likely be the most fruitful, given the
extremely limited scrutiny applied to employer actions in that context. A full development
of the nature of the proposed duty to consider employee accommodation requests, as well
as the scope of court review of the employer's process, must await a further article. It
should be noted, however, that there are numerous legal models from which to draw other
than the labor law obligation to bargain in good faith, including some outside the
employment arena, such as judicial treatment of private agreements to bargain or consider
under contract law.
146 The change in burden of proof might, of course, lead to the more frequent denial of
summary judgment, but by refocusing on burdens of proof, the proposed approach avoids
the problem of inappropriate denials of summary judgment that could arise under current
ADA law.
147 I intentionally omit FMLA interference claims, as where an employer refuses to
provide required leave or to reinstate a returning employee. While courts have sometimes
expressed confusion over the allocation of proof in such cases, the better understanding is
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the case of the FMLA, where an employer violates the statutory interactive process
obligation described above, the court would assume that the employer unlawfully
took account of the employee's use of leave or invocation of rights in rendering a
temporally connected adverse employment decision. Similarly, in the case of a
discriminatory failure to accommodate claim, the court would assume that an
employer who failed in good faith to consider the employee's request was
motivated at least in part by gender or pregnancy. The burden of proof in such
situations would be on the employer to establish that its asserted non-
discriminatory rationale was in fact the reason (or a sufficient reason) for its
decision. Such an approach would be justified on the assumption that an employer
is less likely to be influenced by stereotype and more likely to voluntarily engage
in viable workplace restructuring where an honest and objective interactive process
occurs.
A recent case concerning the enforceability of an arbitration agreement in the
context of an FMLA dispute provides a useful illustration of a procedural
breakdown in which a presumption and burden shift could apply. In Darrah v.
Friendly Ice Cream Corp., the plaintiff was an assistant manager who took FMLA
leave because of a high-risk pregnancy. 48 Darrah alleged that upon returning from
leave, her hours were reduced and she was demoted to a waitress position. 149 The
parties had signed an arbitration agreement that provided for a two-step dispute
resolution process; it required both parties to attempt to resolve any claims through
the "Company Open Door Policy" and, in the event of failure, by binding
arbitration.O50
Within a week of her return to work, Darrah invoked the open-door policy
and requested a meeting with the general manager about her post-leave work
status. 5' According to the plaintiff, the manager laughed and said that Darrah was
"being hormonal."'152 When she went up the chain of command to her district
manager, Darrah was rebuffed again and told that the matter was within the
exclusive control of the store manager.
53
Upon the employer's motion to compel arbitration, the court noted that, by its
terms, the parties' agreement to arbitrate was conditional on the failure of the
open-door policy.154 It went on to explain that an open-door policy is understood to
entail an "interactive . . . process" in which a supervisor and the aggrieved
that the burden is on the employer to justify its actions once the plaintiff shows that she
was a qualified employee and that leave or reinstatement was denied. See supra note 80
and accompanying text. If that is the case, no burden shift would be necessary.
148 328 F. Supp. 2d 319, 319-20 (N.D.N.Y. 2004).
149 Id. at 320-21.
'
50 Id. at 320.
'.' Id. at 320-21.
112 Id. at 321.
153 Id.
154 Id. at 322.
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employee "attempt[] in good faith to resolve the dispute."'155 While Darrah fulfilled
her duty to engage in that process, the defendant did not.
15 6
Given the context of the case, the court used the employer's lack of good faith
as a basis for finding the plaintiffs claim to be non-arbitral: the promise to
arbitrate failed due to the non-fulfillment of the condition precedent that both
parties engage in the open-door policy. 157 In the context of the two-part proposal
advocated in this Article, the employer would be held to have violated its
obligation to engage in an interactive process with Darrah upon her return from
leave. As described above, statutory fees would attach for the violation. In
addition, and perhaps more significantly, the employer would also bear the burden
of proof on the related retaliation claim. Most likely that claim will hinge on a
factual assessment of motive, specifically whether the employer's demotion
decision was based on the plaintiffs FMLA leave or was due to some legitimate
non-discriminatory reason, for instance, a business decision to eliminate the
plaintiff s former position. 5 8 Current doctrine would require Darrah to prove that
her leave was the reason, or at. least a motivating reason, for the employer's
action. 159 Under the proposed approach, however, the procedural violation shifts
the burden of proof of motive to the defendant; the employer must demonstrate
155 Id.
156 id.
157 Id. The court also noted that the employer's failure to participate in the open-door
policy could be read as evidence that it did not consider FMLA claims to be within the
scope of the arbitration agreement, "[o]therwise it would have made at least some attempt
to resolve plaintiffs grievance." Id. at 323.
158 1 analyze Darrah's claim as falling within the anti-retaliation provision of the
FMLA because that is how it is presented in the opinion. See id. at 319. However, based on
the facts, Darrah could have framed her case as a failure to reinstate under the statute. See
29 U.S.C. § 2614(a)(1)(A) (2006). While many courts do not distinguish between these two
types of claims, it is probably more appropriate, and more favorable to the plaintiff, to
analyze factual scenarios such as this one under the failure to reinstate provision of the
statute. See supra note 80. In either case, however, a legitimate elimination of a position
would constitute a defense to liability. See 29 U.S.C. § 2614(a)(3) ("Nothing in this section
shall be construed to entitle any restored employee to ... any right, benefit, or position of
employment other than any right, benefit, or position to which the employee would have
been entitled had the employee not taken the leave"); 29 C.F.R. § 825.216 (2006) ("An
employee has no greater right to reinstatement or to other benefits and conditions of
employment than if the employee had been continuously employed during the FMLA leave
period.").
159 Those courts that have addressed the issue have generally assumed that the mixed-
motive framework set forth by the Supreme Court in Desert Palace v. Costa, Inc., 539 U.S.
68 (2003), is applicable to FMLA claims. See, e.g., Richardson v. Monitronics Int'l, Inc.,
434 F.3d 327, 334-35 (5th Cir. 2005); Gibson v. Louisville, 336 F.3d 511, 513-14 (6th Cir.
2003); Gonzalez v. Minneapolis, 267 F. Supp. 2d 1004, 1010 (D. Minn. 2003).
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that its decision was justified by legitimate reasons not pertaining to the
employee's pregnancy or her invocation of FMLA rights.1
60
The core purpose of these doctrinal changes would be to encourage
compliance with the proposed interactive process amendment with the hopes that
good process can lead to voluntary accommodation. However, there is also reason
to think that the presumption of liability is appropriate in its own right. It would
not be unusual for an employer to take a worker's extended leave into account in
making a subsequent layoff or demotion decision, and perhaps most would not
consider their action to be discriminatory. For instance, as a result of an
employee's extended absence the employer might realize that the employee's
services were not essential, or in the case of the need to reduce or demote staff, the
employer might select the employee who is most frequently absent in order to
preserve office morale.1 61 While there is arguably no legitimate reason to mistreat
employees purely on the basis of a protected characteristic like race or sex, there
are often business reasons to treat employees requiring leave differently from
mainstream workers. Thus, it might be appropriate as a general matter to lighten
the burden on FMLA plaintiffs seeking to establish that retaliatory considerations
played a role in an adverse employment decision.
It is also possible that burden shifting can increase the likelihood of capturing
refusals to accommodate that are influenced by cognitive bias. Illustration 1 in Part
II above involving the pregnant truck driver who was denied a lifting restriction,
provides an example of a situation in which latent biases probably played at least
some part in the decision. In Walker v. Fred Nesbit Distributing Co., the case on
which the fact pattern is based, the employer defended its refusal to accommodate
by attacking the relevance of the male comparators the plaintiff introduced, whose
injuries had been previously accommodated. 162 The employer asserted that because
the male employees had been injured on the job and were receiving workers'
compensation, it made business sense for it to allow them lifting restrictions so that
it would receive at least some labor in return for paying them their statutory
benefits. 163 That rationale was ultimately accepted by a jury that found against
Walker on her pregnancy discrimination claim.'64
160 This burden of proof would be in addition to the burden already placed on a
defendant in a mixed-motive case to prove that it would have made the same decision
about the plaintiffs employment absent any illegal considerations. See 29 U.S.C. § 2000e-
5(g)(2)(B); Costa, 539 U.S. at 94-95. In other words, in mixed-motive cases the employer
would have to prove both that its asserted justification was in fact a cause of its decision
and that the justification was a sufficient basis for the decision. See generally Martin J.
Katz, The Fundamental Incoherence of Title VII: Making Sense of Causation in Disparate
Treatment Law, 94 GEO. L.J. 489 (2006).
161 See, e.g., Rice v. Sunrise Express, Inc., 209 F.3d 1008, 1011 (7th Cir. 2000)
(noting that the employer told the plaintiff she was selected for layoff because she was
"already off").
162 356 F. Supp. 2d 964, 966 (S.D. Iowa 2005).
163 Id.
164 Id. at 968.
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However, an informed examination that keeps in mind the subtle effects of
cognitive bias suggests the employer's actions were suspect, particularly in light of
surrounding facts. Walker produced evidence that despite the employer's alleged
distinction, it had on previous occasions accommodated non-work related injuries
for male employees, a fact that the employer conceded. 165 The company alleged
that it had recently made a change in policy that prohibited accommodation of non-
workplace injuries, but it was unable to produce any written documentation of the
change, nor could it cite a date on which the changed policy had taken effect.
166
Finally, and perhaps most importantly, Walker was the only woman truck driver
employed at the company. 167 Under the circumstances, it is easy to imagine that the
employer's decision not to accommodate Walker was influenced, at least in part,
by an implicit assumption that a woman, particularly a pregnant one, should not be
driving a truck. Indeed, the premise of the employer's defense-that differences in
the type and cause of one's disability merit differential treatment168 -suggests that
the employer could not visualize a pregnant woman as similarly situated to a man
who had injured himself in a workplace accident or in an aggressive game of
football over lunch.
C. Conclusion
Recent developments in discrimination jurisprudence suggest the potential for
a viable organizational justice approach to redressing the diminished employment
quality of working caregivers. In both sexual harassment and disability law, courts
have recognized the role employers play in responding to discrimination in
assessing substantive statutory liability. Such moves implicitly recognize the core
problem underlying second-generation disparities in employment quality-that
historical segregation of non-traditional workers, as well as lingering
misperceptions and stereotypes, perpetuate a status quo in which non-traditional
workers are excluded. An employer who makes proactive efforts and engages with
its non-traditional employees is likely to achieve a more inclusive workplace.
Thus, while courts have not yet realized a fully effective way of providing
incentives for such behavior, one can derive from their initiatives a blueprint for a
meaningful approach to caregiver exclusion. Through a statutory interactive-
process obligation, enforced through a monetary penalty and coupled with a
judicially created burden shift, the law can reframe liability for second-generation
disparities as a problem of encouraging positive behavior rather than searching out
traditional indicia of fault.
161 Id. at 970.
166 Id. at 970-71.
167 Id. at 965.
161 Id. at 966.
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IV. THE CASE FOR PROCESS: THEORETICAL FOUNDATIONS AND EMPIRICAL
SUPPORT FOR AN ORGANIZATIONAL JUSTICE APPROACH
A core argument of this Article is that the use of internal processes can help
employees to successfully effectuate accommodations that serve their needs and at
the same time serve the legitimate business concerns of their employers. As a
corollary, this Article suggests that the law should provide incentives for
accommodation by requiring and protecting private procedural initiatives by the
employers. This section traces the theoretical foundation for such an approach and
explores whether such an approach is likely to be effective, given the absence of an
expansive accommodation mandate addressing working caregivers and the risk
that employers will manipulate a purely procedural initiative.
A. A "Second-Generation "Response to
"Second-Generation " Employment Disparities
The organizational justice model proposed in this Article dovetails two related
trends in employment discrimination scholarship and the broader field of
regulatory theory. The idea of assessing employer liability for discrimination based
on its internal practices rather than specific external standards coincides with
scholarly attention to the way second-generation employment exclusion is
organizationally facilitated and the recognition that organizationally specific
responses are needed. 169 At the same time, the concept of legally facilitated, but
voluntarily created, solutions to such problems resonates with an emerging
regulatory philosophy that combines public oversight with private initiatives to
achieve a cost-effective means of legal enforcement. 170 Drawing on literature from
both fields, this section contends that, properly conceived, an organizational justice
approach to discrimination liability can inspire narrowly tailored, employer-driven
solutions to exclusion; revamp the intent inquiry in assessing legal liability; and
impose a necessary check on voluntary initiatives of employers that might not
169 See, e.g., Green, supra note 1, at 108-11 (providing examples of how work
structure and institutional practices exclude non-traditional workers); Sturm, supra note 1,
at 468-75 (describing how subtle perceptions and patterns of interaction intersect with
ordinary workplace dynamics to exclude women and minorities).
170 See Estlund, supra note 14, at 377-83 (calling for system of monitored employer
self-regulation of labor standards, such as work safety regulations); Orly Lobel, Renew
Deal: The Fall of Regulation and the Rise of Governance in Contemporary Legal Thought,
89 MINN. L. REV. 342, 371-404 (2004) (delineating the organizing principles of an
emerging "renew deal" governance model that involves collaboration and partnership
between regulators and private actors); Sturm, supra note 1, at 553-67 (describing a system
of "dynamic problem solving," combining the roles of the judiciary, individual change
agents, and mediating institutions). For background on the emerging theory of new
regulation outside of the specific employment context, see generally IAN AYRES & JOHN
BRAITHWAITE, RESPONSIVE REGULATION: TRANSCENDING THE DEREGULATION DEBATE
(1992).
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otherwise serve the goals of discrimination law. Ideally, it can also engender
grassroots support for transformative workplace initiatives by treating employers
(and workers) as partners in the process of eradicating second-generation
exclusion.
1. Organizational Justice as Tailored Regulation
A common theme in recent commentary on regulating the workplace is the
need for alternatives to proscriptive rule-oriented efforts in responding to second-
generation exclusion, as well as improving working conditions more generally. 17
The disenchantment with "command and control"'172 approaches to directing
employer conduct recognizes both the complexity of organizational life and the
inherent limitations of top-down approaches in targeting context-specific
behavior. 173
Major settlements reached in recent discrimination class action suits illustrate
the potential for narrow, yet flexible approaches to redressing disparities in
employment quality. In litigation against industry giants such as Home Depot,
American Express, and Abercrombie & Fitch, plaintiffs have challenged
institutional practices, including informal assignment systems, inconsistent
allocation of training, and subjective promotion and hiring procedures that have the
effect of excluding women and minorities.' 74 In settling these cases, plaintiffs'
171 See, e.g., Green, supra note 1, at 144-52 (exposing the need to reframe traditional
discrimination strategies to capture discriminatory workplace dynamics); Sturm, supra note
1, at 475-79 (describing the limits of a rule-enforcement approach in addressing second-
generation discrimination); cf Estlund, supra note 14, at 323 (noting the practical
limitations of an individual litigation model and government agency supervision in
enforcing labor standards and civil rights); Orly Lobel, Interlocking Regulatory and
Industrial Relations: The Governance of Workplace Safety, 57 ADMIN. L. REv. 1071,
1079-86 (2005) (describing the limited ability of government regulators to adequately
inspect worksites and deter noncompliance in the work safety arena).
172 Estlund, supra note 14, at 322.
173 See, e.g., Tristin K. Green, Targeting Workplace Context: Title VII as a Tool for
Institutional Reform, 72 FORDHAM L. REv. 659, 671-72 (2003); Sturm, supra note 1, at
465-79. One analogous example of this type of regulatory failure, and one of particular
consequence to caregivers, is the requirement of time and-a-half compensation for work in
excess of forty hours per week under the Fair Labor Standards Act. This fixed mandate
precludes employer and employees from negotiating alternate arrangements, like "comp
time" in lieu of overtime pay, that might be more desirable to both parties. See Cynthia L.
Estlund, Between Rights and Contract: Arbitration Agreements and Non-Compete
Covenants as a Hybrid Form of Employment Law, 155 U. PA. L. REv. 379, 442-43 (2006)
(suggesting the possible conversion of mandatory overtime pay to a "conditionally
waivable" fight which could be exchanged for "comp time", subject to the assurance that
such time would accrue at the same time-and-a-half rate as overtime pay and would be
available for use at times beneficial to workers).
174 See Green, supra note 173, at 682-87 (discussing key settlements in cases against
Coca-Cola and American Express, among others); Sturm, supra note 1, at 509-19
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counsel have succeeded in obtaining commitments to institutional reform in
addition to monetary relief for victims. Thus, in the Home Depot litigation, for
instance, the defendant agreed to establish a database that systemized selection of
job applicants for interviews, require a minimum of three applicant interviews for
each position, and establish structured interview questions. 75 Home Depot also
agreed to internally monitor the system and to report regularly to class counsel.
176
While the value of these concessions should not be overstated, such commitments
arguably go beyond what the law requires and what a judge would likely have
awarded had these cases succeeded at trial.
177
The question is: by what means can the current legislative regime enable more
widespread adoption of such measures ex ante? It is extraordinarily difficult to
envision an appropriately responsive method of direct regulation. Employers are a
diverse group with different infrastructures, hierarchies, and cultures, as well as
different degrees of heterogeneity in their workforce. 178 In addition, such
organizational characteristics are often in flux. As companies strive to maintain
their competitiveness, they must often accommodate rapid changes in their product
and market bases, requiring them to make frequent, nimble adjustments in their
labor pool and hiring practices. 79 At the same time, the particular problem of
second-generation exclusion is itself elusive, arising through the joint operation of
social psychology and particular organizational practices. In this environment,
traditional rulemaking in the form of new legislation or expanded liability is
unlikely to achieve the requisite, and to some extent conflicting, degrees of
specificity and flexibility needed to defeat subtle biases and effect more inclusive
work practices.180
(discussing the settlement of a Home Depot class action suit brought by female
employees).
175 See Green, supra note 173, at 682-86; Sturm, supra note 1, at 513-14.
176 See Green, supra note 173, at 682-86; Sturm, supra note 1, at 517.
177 My purpose here is not to applaud any particular settlement outcome, and
admittedly, there is some question as to whether the terms of such agreements have
achieved their intended results in particular cases. See, e.g., Michael Selmi The Price of
Discrimination: The Nature of Class Action Employment Discrimination Litigation and its
Effects, 81 TEX. L. REv. 1249, 1286-89 (2003) (critically considering the Home Depot
settlement). Rather the point is to showcase the diversity of results that flows from
collaborative problem-solving, which, in the case of a procedural mandate, would not
replace or preclude civil judgments on other substantive claims.
178 See Lobel, supra note 170, at 359 (describing "diversity of market" on which legal
reform must be brought to bear).
179 1 have described this phenomenon elsewhere at length, as have others. See
generally CAPPELLI, supra note 82, at 59-64; Arnow-Richman, supra note 82, at 1198-
1202; Green, supra note 1, at 104-08; Stone, supra note 82, at 539.
180 See Cary Coglianese & David Lazer, Management-Based Regulation: Prescribing
Private Management to Achieve Public Goals, 37 LAW & Soc'¥ REv. 691, 704-05 (2003)
(asserting that "a strong theoretical justification exists for management based regulation"
over traditional regulatory forms where there is "industry heterogeneity" and it is difficult
to "identify linkages between actions and outputs" as is necessary to create standards for
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In contrast, the protocols that emerge in class actions settlements arise from
organic problem solving, the result of situation-specific issues and jointly
developed solutions. The key then is replicating this environment, absent the threat
of pending litigation, with alternative incentives. In the scholarship of governance
and regulatory theory, commentators have elaborated on how new forms of
regulation can leverage industries' willingness to self-police and the expertise of
institutional actors to achieve well-tailored standards and greater rates of
compliance.181 One notable illustration from the employment context that has
received scholarly attention is the development of cooperative enforcement
strategies within the Occupational Safety & Health Administration ("OSHA").
182
These include a federal program that offers reduced government oversight to
employers that demonstrate the ability to comply with and maintain safety
standards and a variety of state initiatives that require employers to create their
own safety and compliance plans.' 83 What is needed is an analogous approach to
the implementation of civil rights principles, broadly construed. Already scholars
have called for leveraging the expertise of employer agents 184 and incorporating
third-party actors in developing a suitable response to second-generation
exclusion. 85 The anticipated result is more efficient, responsive elaboration of
legal standards and better rates of compliance.' 
86
reducing undesirable outcomes); Sturm, supra note 1, at 475 ("Rules developed
externally... cannot adequately govern the range of circumstances implicated by the
general principle of nondiscrimination .... Any rule specific enough to guide behavior
will inadequately account for the variability, change, and complexity characteristic of
second generation problems.").
181 See generally AYREs & BRAITHWAITE, supra note 170, at 101-33.
182 Coglianese & Lazer, supra note 180, at 698-99; Estlund, supra note 14, at 343-47;
Lobel, supra note 171, at 1104-08.
183 Coglianese & Lazer, supra note 180, at 698-99 (describing OSHA's adoption of a
"process safety management" program for highly hazardous substances under which firms
must implement a risk assessment process and develop, assess, update, and certify
operating procedures that target the elimination of those risks); Lobel, supra note 171, at
1104-08.
184 See Sturm, supra note 1, at 564-66 (calling for greater attention to the problem-
solving function of "individual change agents" within firms, including in-house attorneys
and human resource professionals, in addressing second-generation bias).
185 See id. at 566 (speculating a role for mediating institutions, including the EEOC,
employee organizations, and insurance agencies, in encouraging information sharing and
self-evaluation with respect to second-generation work problems).
186 The achievements of second-generation compliance strategies in the work safety
context have been widely lauded. See Lobel, supra note 171, at 1128-36 (noting successful
rates of compliance and management benefits occasioned by enhanced worker
participation). Of course, the analogy between regulation of workplace safety through
agency rulemaking and regulation by civil rights legislation enforced almost exclusively by
individual lawsuits is a loose one. However, the successes in the former context are
encouraging.
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Such approaches ultimately are consistent with the natural patterns of law and
governance. From the dichotomous tension between substantive regulation and
deregulated markets, an organizational justice approach emerges as a possible
middle ground.1 87 Most scholars have long given up on the idea that market forces
alone will weed out animus-based discrimination, let alone the persistent forms of
exclusion that for all appearances seem natural or efficient. 88 Yet, neither new
lawmaking nor a heightened degree of judicial activism is likely to be forthcoming,
let alone equal to the task. An organizational justice approach avoids the political
divisiveness of traditional legal responses as well as the inherent limitations of
haphazard litigation and judicial enforcement. The upshot is better tailored results
brought about by engaging the people affected (employers and workers) in a
collaborative process that responds to particular problems dynamically.
2. Organizational Justice as Consensus Builder
In the same vein, incentivized organizational justice can build consensus by
incorporating employers in the standard-setting and compliance process. The
approach treats employers as experts in the needs of their organizations, the limits
of their practices, and the best means of addressing second-generation exclusion
within those constraints.1 89 It seeks to transform the workplace incrementally by
facilitating communication and information sharing between workers and
employers and fostering buy-in and commitment on both sides.
Involving employers in a legitimate interactive process that both imposes
limits and respects managerial discretion enables organic, non-threatening
institutional change and learning. Traditional rulemaking presupposes an
adversarial relationship between worker and employer that is arguably outmoded
and often counterproductive. 190 While the business case for flexible work and other
employee-friendly management practices may be somewhat overstated,191 there are
187 See Lobel, supra note 170, at 443 (describing the "renew deal" governance model
as a "third way between state-based, top-down regulation and a single-minded reliance on
market-based norms").
188 See, e.g., Arnow-Richman, supra note 10, at 378-86 (describing how the move
from internal to external labor markets provide disincentives for some forms of voluntary
accommodation); Selmi, supra note 4, at 745-50 (noting the persistence of "rational
discrimination" with respect to caregiving).
189 See, e.g., Coglianese & Lazer, supra note 180, at 695 (noting that management-
based regulation, in which firms engage in their own planning and internal rulemaking
efforts, "place responsibility for decisionmaking with those who possess the most
information about risks and potential control methods").
190 See Lobel, supra note 170, at 376-77 (noting that a regulatory model that involves
top-down decision making by experts "promotes adversarial relations, mutual distrust, and
conflict").
191 See Arnow-Richman, supra note 10, at 378-81 (suggesting that individual
instances of employers voluntarily implementing expansive family-friendly policies are the
exception rather than the rule, and that wide-scale adoption of policies to serve business
interests in worker loyalty and retention are unlikely to be forthcoming).
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certainly synergies that can be exploited, provided the law serves as a facilitator. 92
The point is that such results, however beneficial, are not likely to be achieved
wholly through market forces. Rather, a necessary precondition is the creation of a
safe forum in which to identify and explore change.1 93 That is unlikely to happen
where an expanded liability regime unilaterally imposes additional duties on
employers and management responds by steeling itself against liability. Indeed
top-down approaches and the resistance they are likely to occasion are antithetical
to the inclusive culture second-generation reform efforts seek to foster.
At the same time, organizational justice approaches can lay the foundation for
transformative lawmaking. External laws that strongly conflict with institutional
norms run the risk of being captured by the entities they seek to regulate.
194
Employers may interpret and implement rules in ways that suit their own ends,
infusing them with managerial values that undermine their force and purpose. 195
Courts may be influenced by such behavior or their own normative dissonance,
resulting in judicial retrenchment. 196 At least one way of avoiding such pitfalls is to
slowly develop normative support for transformative law through inclusiveness.
Social science research has suggested that novel legislation is more likely to
succeed where the regulated community is involved in its creation, interpretation,
and application. 97 An organizational justice approach embodies this idea insofar as
192 See infra Part IV.B.2.
193 See Coglianese & Lazar, supra note 180, at 702-03 (noting the need for compelled
planning and risk assessment by employers despite the fact that management and societal
interests often overlap, because employers are likely to resist investing in identifying
synergies for fear they will bear significant costs that will not be justified by significant
private gains).
194 See Krieger, supra note 13, at 497 (describing the problem of "socio-legal
backlash" that occurs "when the application of a transformative legal regime generates
outcomes that conflict with norms and institutions to which influenced segments of the
relevant populace retain strong conscious allegiance").
195 See, e.g., Lauren B. Edelman & Mark C. Suchman, When the "Haves" Hold
Court: Speculations on the Organizational Internalization of Law, 33 LAW & SoC'Y REV.
941, 961-80 (1999); see infra Part 1V.A.5.
196 See, e.g., Arnow-Richman, supra note 10, at 362-73 (describing judicial resistance
to expansive interpretation of ADA and FMLA accommodation mandates stemming from
entrenched notions of formal equality); Bagenstos, Structural Turn, supra note 96 at 35
(suggesting that courts are incapable of evaluating proactive employer conduct absent a
shared normative understanding of what constitutes actionable second generation
discrimination); Travis, supra note 5, at 21-36 (describing judicial misunderstanding of
essential job functions due to the "full-time face-time norm"). See generally Krieger, supra
note 13, at 486 (describing how judges' conscious or unconscious allegiance to traditional
values may constrain their interpretation of transformative law, resulting in rules that
increasingly come to resemble the norms and systems they were designed to displace).
197 See Krieger, supra note 13, at 498-503 (describing the ultimate success of the
Santa Cruz appearance ordinance, as compared to the ADA, where the ordinance applied to
an insular community and was enforced through a mediation process that encouraged
understanding of disputants' competing normative perspectives).
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employers play a critical role in defining and implementing more inclusive work
practices. In addition to achieving individual accommodation for some workers,
the process enables organic cultural change and norm elaboration that may yield a
foundation for broader rulemaking. In this way, an organizational justice approach
can serve as a necessary preliminary step in achieving the broad-based support
required for effective accommodation mandates or substantive benefits laws.
3. Organizational Justice as Democratic Agent
Of equal if not greater importance than the role of employers, is the
organizational justice vision of worker voice. The approach does not simply
provide incentive for positive managerial action, but specifically rewards action
taken on the basis of and in response to a dialogue with affected workers.
This is critical in several respects. In a post-union world where traditional
representation is largely absent, employees often have no voice in basic
compensation and benefits decisions, let alone specific workplace policies. Almost
nothing in our arsenal of substantive rights laws addresses this problem.' 98 In
contrast, an organizational justice approach-one that requires employers to
communicate with their workers and gives them an incentive to listen-reflects a
shift toward greater employee participation in the terms of their employment.
Whereas employees are generally the objects of employers' unilateral
implementation of legal rules, the organizational justice model views them as
active, participatory citizens in their employers' compliance practices and
decision-making process.199
In this way, the organizational justice approach coincides with other trends in
the contemporary workplace. While employees may have limited say in the terms
and conditions of employment, they are increasingly participating in the business
and production decisions of their employers. In many companies, flattened
hierarchies have replaced traditional advancement and decision-making ladders,
and collaborative teamwork has eclipsed supervisory relationships.2 °° In these
environments, employees are viewed as stakeholders in the success of the business
and are expected to act as entrepreneurs in initiating and developing novel ideas.20'
It is a short stretch from this model of fostering and managing human capital
within firms to engaging employees in decisions about their own employment
terms. Thus, organizational justice approaches can leverage the emerging model of
decentralized, democratic business decision making to include employees as
198 See Estlund, supra note 14, at 326 (asserting that contemporary statutes and
common law doctrines governing terms and conditions of employment "do nothing to fill
the vacuum-the democratic deficit-left by the decline of unionization and collective
bargaining").
199 See Lobel, supra note 170, at 371-76.
200 See CAPPELLI, supra note 82, at 59-64; Amow-Richman, supra note 82, at 1198-
1202; Green, supra note 1, at 98-104; Stone, supra note 82, at 533-35.
201 See CAPPELLI, supra note 82, at 59-64; Arnow-Richman, supra note 82, at 1198-
1202; Green, supra note 1, at 101; Stone, supra note 82, at 533.
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experts and collaborators in the various ways their jobs can and should be
packaged and performed.
Finally, while organizational justice is hardly a substitute for traditional
bargaining, it may create a framework for collective action. Research suggests that
even the mobilization of individual rights is a social process; the act of naming a
right as such derives in part from the aggrieved individual discussing his or her
situation with others, recognizing shared experiences, and learning about the
law.2 °2 In the workplace, such interactions between employees can lead to a culture
where unilateral employer action is questioned and even delegitimized.2 °3 As
employees become aware of the legal dimensions and commonality of their
grievances, they may be more likely to view their situation in the context of a
broader rights discourse and more inclined to engage in explicitly concerted
action.
204
4. Organizational Justice as Liability Proxy
Incentivized organizational justice also offers a concrete alternative to
animus-based intent as the touchstone for discrimination liability. A conceptual
challenge to the expanded use of discrimination law is the absence of fault, as
traditionally understood, in the behavior that perpetuates disparate employment
quality. In the context of cognitive bias, the mental schemas that color managerial
decision making operate subconsciously. 20 5 The cognitive categories and
associations that lead to skewed results may be tied at some level to prejudicial
assumptions or even animus, but their operation is by definition unintentional. In
contrast, where exclusion results from structural impediments, such as job design
or organizational norms, the workplace conduct or circumstances might fairly be
described as intentional, but that intent is morally benign. If an employer places a
fifty-pound lifting requirement on its truck drivers or demands full-time, in-office
work hours from its attorneys, the employer is certainly intending to exclude a
subset of workers, but it is not motivated by animus toward a protected class.
Of course, it is by no means clear that prejudicial motive is a required
predicate to liability under existing law, and certainly there are many functional
202 See ENGEL & MUNGEL, supra note 141, at 78-80, 90-98; Catherine Albiston,
Bargaining in the Shadow of Social Institutions: Competing Discourses and Social Change
in Workplace Mobilization of Civil Rights, 39 LAW & Soc'Y REv 11, 27-28 (2005).
203 See Albiston, supra note 202, at 43 (finding in a study of employees who
informally challenged employer decisions about family medical leave that "the existence of
legal rights prompted [employees] to talk with others about their experiences in the
workplace, to discuss whether their employer's actions were legitimate, and in some
instances, to band together to resist their employer's reinterpretation of [the law]").
204 See id. at 28 ("[Ijnformal rights mobilization through workplace interactions...
can also encourage workers to conceptualize their problems as part of a broader system of
power and control .... In some instances.., sharing information can create a collective
framework for interpreting opposition to rights.").
205 See, supra, II.B. 1 .b.
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and normative arguments for treating "unintentional" and "intentional"
discrimination as equivalents. °6 However, accepting those premises does not
resolve the challenging question of how to determine what unintentional conduct
and which neutral structures should be actionable. In practice, liability under
existing antidiscrimination and accommodation laws turns on proof structures that
are at least loosely tied to the animus and intent constructs. A showing of disparate
treatment requires that a jury find a discriminatory motive, historically understood
as a conscious act; while avoiding liability for failure to accommodate under
disability law turns on the employer's rational (that is, cost-driven rather than
animus-based) justifications for its decision.2 °7 Infusing such concepts with an
appreciation for the exclusionary effects of morally benign conduct may prove
more difficult than theorizing a rationale for doing so.
For instance, some argue that placing cognitively biased decision making
within the realm of ordinary disparate treatment law will not achieve the intended
result of shifting the cost of unconsciously inflicted harm from employees to
employers. 8 Because the operation of bias is difficult to detect, courts are likely
to be poor judges of whether a particular decision has been unlawfully tainted,
resulting in employers being routinely over- or under-charged for the biases in
which they engage.20 9 In addition, because such biases are difficult to control,
employers may act inefficiently in responding to the risk of liability, for instance,
206 See, e.g., Bagenstos, supra note 79, at 837-38 (suggesting that antidiscrimination
law aims not so much at eradicating animus as eliminating exclusion, as evidenced by
existing prohibitions on "rational" discrimination); Jolls, supra note 52, at 651-52
(suggesting that antidiscrimination disparate impact theory and accommodation
requirements are functionally equivalent; in both cases employers must engage in
affirmative behavior to account for the disparate effects of neutral practices); Selmi,
Disparate Impact Theory, supra note 44 at 760 (suggesting that the historical equating of
disparate treatment liability with proof of animus or motive was unnecessary and "borne
out of a strikingly limited definition of intent"); Wax, supra note 21, at 1138-39 (noting
that intent can be understood as both scienter and as a causal link between a mental
influence and a particular decision).
207 This discussion is not intended to suggest that discrimination law, as currently
applied, contains no hook for redressing "unintentional" conduct, for indeed there is some
room within existing law to capture unconscious behavior. See Hart, supra note 3, at 750;
Michael Selmi, Proving Intentional Discrimination: The Reality of Supreme Court
Rhetoric, 86 GEO. L.J. 279, 285, 335-38 (1997); Wax, supra note 21, at 1149-50 (noting
that while the McDonnell Douglas framework is "formally at odds with liability for
unconscious forms of disparate treatment ... there inevitably will be some degree of
overlap in the evidence that tends to prove 'pretext' and the evidence that tends to prove
unconscious bias"). Instead, the assertion is that because such conduct is not the principle
wrong that the law is designed to address, existing doctrine does not supply a useful
framework for distinguishing between conduct and circumstances that should trigger
liability and those that should fall outside of the legal apparatus. See Bagenstos, Structural
Turn, supra note 96 at 35.
208 See Wax, supra note 21, at 1149-50.
209 Id.
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by categorically reducing adverse actions taken against protected employees or
adopting affirmative-action programs that eliminate statistical imbalances without
actually diminishing the effects of cognitive bias.21 °
An appropriate response to this problem, however, is not to ignore these
harms, so much as to identify the circumstances under which they are most likely
to occur, and restructure discrimination liability in ways that encourage employers
to reevaluate and disable the structures that perpetuate bias. Professor Tristin
Green's work on structural discrimination and disparate treatment theory suggests
as much.2 1 Drawing on social science evidence,212 Professor Green proposes
holding employers liable in situations where their organizational practices and
structures enable discriminatory race or gender bias.2t 3 Importantly, liability under
such an approach would be tied to the internal practices of the employer and be
structured in ways that encourage employers to act proactively to prevent structural
exclusion. Professor Green directs courts and litigants to look for proactive
conduct, such as employer efforts to construct and monitor heterogeneous work
groups and provide guidance and structure for decision making, which some
research suggests can minimize the likelihood of stereotyping and bias.21 4 A
finding of "unreasonable institutional enabling of discriminatory bias" would
permit courts to order employers to implement such safeguards and create a
presumption of liability in favor of individuals alleging harm.215
Of course, such a proposal is not without flaws, 216 but it provides one example
of how scholars have begun to reconceive discrimination law to reflect a better
understanding of organizational dynamics and how they affect the employment
quality of non-traditional workers. 217 What it offers is an alternative to the
intent/liability paradigm that has long been the centerpiece of discrimination
jurisprudence. The goal is to provide impetus for structural change and problem
solving while acknowledging there are organizational forces and individual
211 See Green, supra note 1, at 145 (suggesting that the law should focus on the
employer's role in enabling the effects of latent bias in applying the disparate treatment
framework).
212 See id. at 96-99.
213 See id. at 93.
214 See id. at 147.
21 Id. at 148.
216 For instance, it is not clear how in practice such a standard would distinguish
between "unreasonable enabling" by the employer and benign complacency. See
Bagenstos, Structural Turn, supra note 96 at 35. Also potentially problematic is the
prospect of injunctive remedies upon a finding of liability, which will doubtlessly prove
difficult to delineate and enforce.
217 As another example, Professor Vicki Schultz has proposed a presumption of
employer liability for sexual harassment where women are insufficiently represented in the
workforce. See Vicki Schultz, The Sanitized Workplace, 112 YALE L.J. 2061, 2174-76
(2003).
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subconscious biases the employer does not control and for which it would not be
appropriate to hold the employer liable.218
5. Organizational Justice as Reality Check
A final reason for the adoption of an organizational justice model is that
private initiatives aimed at redressing discrimination already exist and are
proliferating. As scholars have noted, companies have become increasingly reliant
on internal professionals, such as in-house attorneys and human resource experts,
to interpret and comply with the law in the face of legal complexity. 21 9 Uncertainty
and the threat of litigation have led such experts to put in place proactive
procedures to prevent and correct conduct that may lead to a lawsuit. 220 Thus,
practices such as diversity training and anti-discrimination polices long predated
the special status conferred on them by the Supreme Court's harassment
jurisprudence.
In many instances, such initiatives can provide immediate and effective
assistance to workers without the delay and costs associated with litigation. For
example, there is reason to believe that despite pro-defendant ADA jurisprudence,
many employer accommodation initiatives have helped workers with disabilities
achieve some level of workplace integration.2  In addition, employer efforts to
head off liability sometimes go beyond legal requirements to benefit groups not
otherwise protected and attempt large-scale cultural changes at work.222 It is also
likely that judicial consideration of employer corrective action in assessing hostile
work environment liability has led at least some employers to create effective
response protocols. Where prompt intervention by human resource professionals
ends harassing behavior, both employer and employee are likely better off than if
judicial intervention is required.
However, there is no reason to take on faith that private initiatives, developed
and administered under the radar of traditional enforcement mechanisms, will be
used appropriately for the benefit of those the law was designed to protect. 23
Research shows that the way companies respond to and interpret legal directives
218 See Green, supra note 1, at 149-50 (suggesting that a "structural account" of
disparate treatment law would aim to "create incentives for problem solving within
institutions without deligitimizing the task by holding employers liable for forms of
discrimination over which they have no realistic means of control").
219 See Sturm, supra note 1, at 527-30.
220 See Edelman & Suchman, supra note 195, at 953-58; Estlund, supra note 14, at
335-38.
221 See ENGEL & MUNGEL, supra note 141, at 243-44; Befort, supra note 112, at 622-
28.
222 See Estlund, supra note 14, at 334.
223 As Professor Cynthia Estlund writes, in the context of enforcement of wage/hour
and health/safety laws, self-regulation is either a boon or a bane depending on how the law
responds to it. Id. at 321-23.
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reflects managerial values, such as productivity and conflict avoidance.2 24 This can
result in a culture of compliance that deviates in significant ways from the rule of
law. For instance, Professor Vicki Schultz has demonstrated that employers widely
misconstrue sexual harassment law as broadly prohibiting physical advances and
other sexualized conduct, reflecting entrenched notions of the workplace as a
rational space removed from emotional distractions. 225 As a result, employers may
fail to discipline hostile non-sexual behavior directed at women and ignore larger
issues of inequality that allow such harassment to flourish. Indeed, allegations of
"sexual harassment," misunderstood in this way, may ultimately be levied unfairly
against workers engaged in legally permissible conduct, or worse, used as a pretext
for discriminatory discipline or termination of workers deemed suspect.226
Thus, there is a risk that, absent meaningful oversight, private initiatives may
evolve in ways that are divorced from or even counterproductive to the goals of the
laws that spawn them. Once such initiatives become incorporated into the
institutional culture, adulterated legal norms become the benchmark for evaluating
conduct within that workplace. 227 While that problem will not disappear under the
proposed regime, the incentivized organizational justice approach calls for greater
public examination of employer-sponsored initiatives than currently exists. The
point is that deference to employer practices is a far cry from deregulation;
external law remains relevant. Indeed, contemporary regulatory proposals that
espouse institutional self-governance in other areas, such as workplace safety,
incorporate checks and balances like independent monitoring and employee
22
whistleblower protection. 28 If liability (or litigation incentives) is linked to
serious, searching review of the quality and effectiveness of employer practices, an
organizational justice model can ideally flush out employers who intentionally
flout the law, as well as more modest failures by well-intentioned employers,
enabling more effective responses to workplace exclusion.
B. Will it Work?
Whatever theoretical support regulatory theory may provide to organizational
justice principles generally, ultimately the critical question is whether the
caregiving proposal developed in this Article can work in practice. There may be
no way to truly test the proposal short of adoption, but both anecdotal and
empirical evidence offer reason to be hopeful. In the United Kingdom, legislation
224 See, e.g., Schultz, supra note 217, at 2090-94 (explaining how the proscription
against workplace sexual harassment has been interpreted by employers as consistent with
an ideal of a sanitized workplace focused on productivity and divorced from passion and
emotion). See generally Lauren B. Edelman et al., Diversity Rhetoric and the
Managerialization of Law, 106 AM. J. SOC. 1589 (2001).
225 See Schultz, supra note 217, at 2103-19.
226 See id. at 2119-31 (noting that charges of harassment are disproportionately levied
against men of color and gay men).
227 See Edelman et al., supra note 224, at 1589.
228 See Estlund, supra note 14, at 393-94.
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providing caregivers with a procedural "right to request" flexible work hours,
which offers a close parallel to the current proposal, has achieved initial success.
229
In addition, evidence of past employer accommodation efforts in the United States,
directed toward both caregivers and the disabled, suggests that companies are
willing to provide some forms of accommodation voluntarily.2 30 Finally, a
preliminary examination of organizational and social psychology studies offer
reason to hope that workplace procedures developed in response to the current
proposal will empower non-traditional workers and erode cognitive bias.231
1. Lessons from the United Kingdom
A number of European countries already have laws giving a degree of
protection to workers seeking flexible work hours, or other changes in work
schedule.232 One British initiative is notable for coupling an expansive view of
flexible work with significant deference to the business interests of employers.
Under the "flexible working" provisions of the Employment Act of 2002 (the
"Act"), British employees with primary caretaking responsibility for a child under
six years of age have a statutory "right to request" a flexible work arrangement.233
Flexible work includes anything that varies from the ordinary work patterns of the
organization, including flextime, compressed hours, working from home, and job
sharing, among others.234 While the employer has no obligation to adopt the
proposal, the employer must seriously consider the request and, in the event the
request is denied, justify its decision based on the needs of the business. 235
This "soft touch" law, as its supporters have called it, doubtlessly triggers
legitimate skepticism on the part of employee advocates and feminist legal
scholars.236 On its face, the Act confers no substantive rights. An employee always
has the ability to request changes in working conditions, and a law that places no
obligation on the employer to accept the worker's proposal may seem a hollow
229 See infra Part IV.B. 1.
230 See infra Part IV.B.2.
231 See infra Part IV.B.2.
232 See, e.g., Employment Act, 2002, c. 22, § 47 (Eng.), available at http://www.opsi.
gov.uk.acts/acts2002/20022--f.htm (giving British parents of children under age six the
right to request flexible work).
233 Id. This includes an adoptive parent, guardian, foster parent, step-parent, or
parenting partner. See Terms and Conditions of Employment, 2002, S.I. 2002/3236,
3(1)(b) (U.K.). The right to request also applies to caretakers of disabled children up to age
eighteen. Employment Act, 2002, c. 22, § 47.
234 See U.K. DEP'T OF TRADE & INDUS., FLEXIBLE WORKING: THE RIGHT TO REQUEST
AND THE DUTY TO CONSIDER 9-10 (2003) [hereinafter RIGHT TO REQUEST].
235 See ARIANE HEGEWISCH, CTR. FOR WORKLIFE LAW, EMPLOYERS AND EUROPEAN
FLEXIBLE WORKING RIGHTS: WHEN THE FLOODGATES WERE OPENED 5 (2005).
236 See Audio tape: The Family Squeeze Conference Series: Right to Request Flexible
Work: U.K. Emerging Lessons, held by the Center for Law and Social Policy (Jan. 28,
2005), available at http://www.clasp.org/audio/012805.m3u.
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exercise. What makes the United Kingdom's "right to request" meaningful is its
focus on the quality and fairness of the process by which such requests are
proposed and reviewed. The law achieves this through a set of particularized steps
with which each side must comply during the course of the application and
consideration process. Upon receipt of a request for flexible work, the employer
must meet with the worker face-to-face to discuss his or her application, after
which the employer must respond within fourteen days. 237 Although the employer
has discretion to deny the request, it may do so only on the basis of specific cost or
management conflicts.238 If the employer denies a request, the employee may
appeal the decision internally, in which case the employer must meet with the
employee again to discuss its decision and provide a second response.239 Should
the employer fail to complete any of these steps, the employee may pursue a claim
with the appropriate employment tribunal.24 °
This detailed legislative framework goes beyond the approach advocated in
this Article, which permits employers to establish their own procedures, judged by
a general standard of good faith. However, the U.K. law offers useful lessons on
what fair process means and how procedural law can encourage constructive
employer practices. Notably, the U.K. law explicitly anticipates and encourages
cooperation: agency guidance on the law and its requirements addresses not only
employer compliance, but employee obligations as well, prescribing "best
practice[s]" for both camps. 24 1 The assumption is that employers want to provide
flexible schedules for their workers, but need a better understanding of their
individual needs, as well as some creative insight, in order to find suitable ways of
achieving that result.242 By establishing a formal procedure for lodging and
responding to accommodation requests, the law aims to place both parties on the
same side of the table where they can educate one another and engineer mutually
beneficial solutions. 43
To the end of shared responsibility, the Act carefully balances the obligations
of the employer and employee. As with the interactive process under the ADA, it is
the duty of the employee to come up with a proposal for flexible work and initiate
the statutory procedure. This must be done in the form of a "carefully thought-out"
written application to the employer,2" that takes account of how the proposal will
impact the employer and how any negative effects might be eliminated or
237 Terms and Conditions of Employment, 2002, 3(1), 4.
238 Employment Act, 2002, c. 22, § 47.
239 Terms and Conditions of Employment, 2002, 6, 8, 9, 10.
240 Employment Act, 2002, c. 22, § 47. Damages of up to eight weeks pay may be
awarded. See id.
241 See RIGHT TO REQUEST, supra note 234, at 2-4.
242 Id. at 2 (noting that "employers know that it makes good business sense to provide
flexible working opportunities for their staff," but "[n]ot all employers are aware of the
different ways to arrange work" to accommodate workers' needs).
243 Id. (suggesting that the request process "facilitate[s] discussion and enables both
parties to gain a clear understanding of each other's thinking").244 id.
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addressed.2 45 This requirement not only prevents facially unreasonable requests, it
sets the stage for constructive discussions between the parties and shared respect
for their competing concerns. In effect, the Act treats the employee as having a
stake in and responsibility for the business as a whole when making a request. For
instance, if a flexible work proposal could have repercussions on coworkers, the
law contemplates that the employee will take those potential effects into account,
including, if necessary, discussing his or her proposal with coworkers and
obtaining their feedback.246 Similarly, the employee is expected to structure and
present his or her proposal so as to maximize the benefit to the employer where
possible.247
The Act requires an equal degree of thoughtfulness on the part of the
employer. The employer may not reject a request without open-minded
participation in a face-to-face meeting with the worker,248 and it may subsequently
deny the request only for a legitimate and supportable business reason, which must
be explained in writing.2 49 It is not enough for the employer simply to state that the
request is costly or incompatible with its needs; government guidance suggests that
an explanation for denying a request should be approximately two paragraphs
long.250 The employer must be able to back up any business rationale with facts.
Given that there is no substantive right under the U.K. law, remedies and
oversight are limited. However, the employee may file a complaint based on any
failure to follow the procedure, in which case the tribunal can order the employer
to reinstitute the process2 In addition, a reviewing tribunal may make a limited
review of the rationale for denying an application. It must defer to the business
judgment of the employer, but it may find a violation where it can be shown that
the employer relied on inaccurate facts or information in rendering the decision.252
Finally, an employee is protected against retaliation for seeking flexible work. In
245 Employment Act, 2002, c. 22, § 47.
246 See, e.g., RIGHT TO REQUEST, supra note 234, at 9 (providing a case study of a
request for reduced hours scenario in which an employee reports in his application that he
has discussed his preferred schedule with coworkers and that they support it).
247 See, e.g., id. at 13 (providing a case study of a request for altered hours scenario in
which an employee reports in her application that shifting her hours from morning to lunch
time will maximize staffing during the busiest part of the work day).
248 Both parties must come to the meeting "prepared to be flexible" and willing to
discuss alternative arrangements besides the employee's request. Id. at 17.
249 Recognized reasons for rejecting a flexible work request are limited to additional
cost, inability to reorganize staff or recruit additional staff, detrimental impact on quality,
performance, or customer demand, insufficient work, or planned structural change.
Employment Act, 2002, c. 22, § 47.
250 RIGHT TO REQUEST, supra note 234, at 24.
251 Terms and Conditions of Employment, 2002, S.I. 2002/3207, 6 (U.K.).
252 However, the explanation may be examined more closely in a case where the
employee also alleges discrimination, for instance, on the basis of disparate. impact (what
the United Kingdom terms "indirect discrimination"). See RIGHT TO REQUEST, supra note
234 at 40-41.
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the case of any violation, the tribunal may award the employee up to eight weeks
pay subject to a statutory cap.253
Most importantly, research on the effects of the U.K. law has shown positive
results. The creation of the law and the articulation of a "right" to request appear to
have made a difference in the frequency with which employees make requests for
flexible work. Twenty-eight percent of organizations reported an increase in
requests compared to past years, which included not only requests from those
eligible under the new law, but from other employees as well.25 4 More importantly,
of those eligible employees submitting requests, seventy-five percent received full
voluntary approval by the employer.255 Studies of similar European laws also show
high rates of compliance.256 Finally, while employers are split over whether the
right to request helps or hurts business, ninety percent of employers perceived
compliance with the new law to be unproblematic. 7 Less than thirteen percent of
U.K. employers reported that cost was an issue in implementing the right to
request. 8
While it is probably too soon to reach definitive conclusions about the success
of the U.K. law, preliminary information about the British experience gives ample
reason to believe that legislatively conferred procedural rights can be worthwhile.
Among other things, such laws can create awareness among employees, encourage
requests, lay the groundwork for cooperation between employees and employers,
and in at least some cases result in jointly achieved, tailored accommodations for
the benefit of caregivers.259
253 Terms and Conditions of Employment, 2002, 7.
254 JODIE LEVIN-EPSTEIN, CTR. FOR LAW & SOC. POLICY, HOW TO EXERCISE
FLEXIBLE WORK: TAKE STEPS WITH A "SOFT TOUCH" LAW 5 (2005), available at http://
www.clasp.org/publications/work-life-brf3.pdf.
255 Id. at 4. Another study found seven out of ten requests were fully approved, and
one in ten partially approved. HEGEWISCH, supra note 235, at 2.
256 A study of a similar German law concluded that nine out of ten requests were
accepted by employers, while a study of the comparable Dutch law found that six out of ten
were fully accepted and one out of ten partially accepted. HEGEWISCH, supra note 235, at 2.
257 Id. at 5.
258 Id. at 2.
259 Obviously there are differences between the United States and the United
Kingdom that might affect societal receptiveness to comparable protective legislation and
its ultimate effectiveness. For instance, by European Union ("E.U.") directive, part-time
workers are entitled to parity in pay and access to benefits, and Europe obviously has a
stronger regulatory culture with respect to labor issues generally. See LEVIN-EPSTEN,
supra note 254, at 6-7 (summarizing the minimum standards for paid and unpaid leave
prescribed by U.K. and E.U. law). But the nature of the British proposal, with its absence
of any substantive mandate, is consistent with the hands-off American approach to
workplace regulation and certainly more deferential to business than other civil rights laws,
like the ADA. Moreover, the absence of additional protections for American caregivers
seems likely to affect the type of requests lodged more so than their frequency or
acceptability. Thus, in the United States, where part-time employees often do not receive
benefits, employees may request pro rata access to employer benefit plans as part of their
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2. The Sociological Effects of Organizational Justice in the Workplace
While the U.K. law offers an important case study of the potential
effectiveness of an organizational justice approach to caregiver accommodation,
social science literature offers a further empirical basis for supposing such an
approach can achieve positive results. Research and anecdotal experience suggest
that employers are predisposed to engage in accommodations when they are
discoverable and mutually advantageous, that the existence of formal procedures
can empower workers, and that interaction between employer and employee can
help overcome stereotype and bias.
While data on the implementation of accommodations for the disabled are
scarce, existing data contradict the assumption of discrimination scholarship that
employers wish to avoid accommodating workers. Research gathered prior to the
adoption of the ADA shows that even before legal mandates, some companies
accommodated disabled employees voluntarily, finding it inexpensive and positive
for workplace morale and efficiency.26° Current research shows that employers
routinely provide accommodations to employees who do not meet the ADA's
definition of disability.261 Moreover, the types of accommodations employers
provide often go beyond what the ADA actually requires. The most transformative
types of accommodations-and the ones most likely to be found unreasonable or
incompatible with essential job functions by courts, such as job restructuring,
accommodation requests; if employers are not amenable to such proposals, we might
expect workers concerned about benefits to seek smaller reductions in hours, or flexible
hours, rather than part-time status.
Perhaps the more critical distinction between the U.K. and U.S. systems with respect
to a procedural initiative is that employment claims in the U.K. are heard by specialized
tribunals. In contrast, the task of reviewing the request and consideration process under a
comparable American law would fall to federal judges with less expertise and heavy
dockets. Cf Bagenstos, Structural Turn, supra note 96 at 34 (raising questions about the
competence and willingness of courts to review institutional practices in assessing
substantive liability for structural discrimination). While this concern ought not preclude
experimentation with procedural mandates, it does suggest that careful elaboration of the
nature of the employer's obligation and scope of judicial review will be critical to the
success of such an endeavor. A thorough evaluation of the various legal models of
procedural compliance that could offer a baseline for such efforts, see note 145 supra, is
beyond the scope of this Article.
260 See Barbara A. Lee & Karen A. Newman, Employer Responses to Disability:
Preliminary Evidence and a Research Agenda, 8 EMP. RESPS. & RTs. J. 209, 221 (1995)
(finding that, out of a sample of fifty private sector companies in New Jersey who had
accommodated at least one employee with a disability prior to the enactment of the ADA,
ninety-two percent of employers said that their experience was successful).
261 See Helen A. Schartz, et al., Workplace Accommodations: Empirical Study of
Current Employees, 75 Miss. L.J. 917, 941-42 (2006) (finding in nationwide study of
employers who contacted the Job Accommodation Network that forty-three percent of
accommodated employees did not suffer a substantial limitation of a major life activity).
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working from home, and flexible hours-have been implemented by employers on
a voluntary basis.
62
The same thing is happening to some extent in the work/family context
despite the absence of an affirmative mandate. Many employers already provide a
limited amount of paid leave to workers taking parental leave or provide workers
the option of using other forms of paid leave to cover FMLA leave. 263 Some offer
flexible scheduling arrangements or other accommodations that can help
caregivers transition back to work following leave.2 64 One study found that small
employers not subject to the FMLA voluntarily abided by its provisions, holding
jobs open for twelve weeks, or more, for a variety of family-related reasons,
including some not covered by federal law.265 In addition, widely publicized
262 See Barbara Granger et al., Findings from a National Survey of Job Coaches and
Job Developers About Job Accommodations Arranged Between Employers and People with
Psychiatric Disabilities, 9 J. VOCATIONAL REHAB. 235, 240 (1997) (citing employers'
willingness to offer, among other accommodations, the option to work part-time hours,
flexible work schedules, and adaptation of existing job descriptions); Lee & Newman,
supra note 260, at 218; Craig Zwerling et al., Workplace Accommodations for People with
Disabilities: National Health Interview Survey Disability Supplement, 45 J.
OCCUPATIONAL & ENVTL. MED. 517, 520 (2003) (finding that part-time work and flexible
scheduling are cited as the most commonly received accommodations). For an explanation
of the economic incentives to employer accommodation in the disability context, see
generally Seth D. Harris, Law, Economics and Accommodations in the Internal Labor
Market, 10 U. PA. J. Bus. & LAB LAW (forthcoming 2007-08), available at http://
papers.ssrn.com/sol3/cfdev/AbsByAuth.cfm?perid=l 11769.
263 See HEATHER BOUSHEY, CTR. FOR ECON. & POLICY RESEARCH, FAMILY-
FRIENDLY POLICIES: BOOSTING MOTHERS' WAGES 6-7 (2005) (finding that prior to the
California program providing paid leave for workers caring for a new child or sick family
member in 2002, data collected from 1996 and 2001 indicated 42.9% of mothers that took
maternity leave received some pay from employers, either in the form of paid maternity
leave or other paid leave, including sick leave, disability, and vacation); Eileen Appelbaum
& Ruth Milkman, Achieving A Workable Balance: New Jersey Employers' Experiences
Managing Employee Leaves and Turnover, Center for Women and Work, School of
Management and Labor Relations, Rutgers, The State University of New Jersey 5-6
(finding that about half of New Jersey employers interviewed offered paid parental or
family leave and almost all offered other fringe benefits that could serve as sources of
income during family-related leaves).
264 See Kelly, supra note 2, at 30-35 (describing a variety of voluntary employer
efforts to accommodate caregiving and their effectiveness); Jennifer E. Swanberg et al., A
Question of Justice: Disparities in Employees' Access to Flexible Schedule Arrangements,
26 J. FAM. ISSUES 866, 869-70 (2005) (finding studies of large and small employers show
that sixty-eight percent of workplaces with one hundred or more employees and eighty
percent of small businesses with fewer than fifty employees reported that at least some of
their workforce has the ability to adjust their work hours, and that the proportion of full-
time workers with flexible schedules doubled between 1991 and 1997).
265 See Appelbaum & Milkman, supra note 268 at 8-10.
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initiatives within particular companies, such as Best Buy,
266 Deloitte & Touche, 267
and Fleet Bank,268 show an inclination on the part of at least some employers to
make meaningful changes to their work structures to help all employees balance
life needs.2 69 Thus, there is no reason to assume that employers will automatically
deny proposed accommodations in the absence of a legal requirement, and to the
extent that employers are willing to accommodate, an interactive process ensures
that their voluntary initiatives actually serve the needs of those who require them.
A second important area of empirical research is the study of procedural
justice and distributive justice perceptions. Research in organizational psychology
has long suggested that employees who have a voice in organizational decisions
are more likely to view their employer as fair.27° While initially this research
theorized that the value in procedural justice lay in the assumption that fair process
leads to distributionally fair outcomes, later research found that the perception of
fairness was present even in cases with seemingly unfavorable outcomes.27' On
one hand, this may be cause for concern. If employees perceive their workplace to
be fair when it actually is not, there is a serious risk that employers will adopt
procedures that merely perpetuate the status quo.272 However, there is another way
266 See Jyoti Thottam, Reworking Work, TIME, July 25, 2005, at 50, 50-55 (discussing
Best Buy's establishment of a "results-oriented work environment" at their Minneapolis
headquarters where nearly half of the workforce chooses when and whether to come in to
the office on a fluctuating basis).
267 See Sturm, supra note 1, at 492 (discussing Deloitte & Touche's "Women's
Initiative" program under which the company created participatory task forces to determine
the cause of a gender gap in promotion and turnover and implemented changes to address
those underlying conditions, resulting in increased rates of advancement and reduced
turnover for women employees).
268 See Elaine St. James, More Employers Offer Flexible Work Policies, WASH.
TIMES, Jan. 30, 2001, at E2 (discussing Fleet Financial Group's decision to offer every
employee a flexible schedule after finding that managers with flexible schedules generate
millions of dollars more in new business than their full-time counterparts).
269 See Sue Shellenbarger, Employers Step Up Efforts to Lure Stay-at-Home Mothers
Back to Work, WALL ST. J., Feb. 9, 2006, at DI (describing employer family-friendly
initiatives designed to help women return to the work force after taking time off to raise
children).
270 See N. Ramamoorthy & P.C. Flood, Gender and Employee Attitudes: The Role of
Organizational Justice Perceptions, 15 BRIT. J. MGMT. 247, 249-50 (2004) (summarizing
studies that found increased employer communication about procedures and processes
resulted in fewer employee perceptions of inequities).
271 Id. at 255 (finding that a "fair process of consistent enforcement of standards and
the opportunity to resolve differences may result in more favorable perceptions of the
outcome itself").
272 See Phyllis A. Siegel et al., The Moderating Influence of Procedural Fairness on
the Relationship Between Work-Life Conflict and Organizational Commitment, 90 J.
APPLIED PSYCHOL. 13, 20 (2005) (suggesting that employers may be able to avoid costly
content-based work-life programs and still preserve employee commitment by exhibiting
procedural fairness through such techniques as involving workers in discussions of
workload and listening respectfully to their concerns about managing multiple demands).
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to interpret the data. Social science research shows that procedurally fair treatment
of individuals within groups signals value to the group, enhancing self-esteem and
instilling a sense of empowerment.273 This is critical with respect to employees
who might not otherwise feel free to engage their employers informally. Studies
suggest the benefits of voluntarily provided flexible scheduling programs fall
primarily on white, professional workers; non-white workers in lower educational
and earnings brackets reported less ability to access such opportunities.274
Transparent, consistent policies could be important to an employee in this category
who does not have access to or comfort with the informal channels that privileged
workers are capable of exploiting to obtain special work arrangements.275 Where
procedures are formalized and equally available to all, an employee who was
otherwise inhibited might be more likely to request and press for an
accommodation.
The same research also offers hope that organizational justice exercises will
foster positive group sentiment that could lessen the risk of resentment by non-
accommodated workers. One explanation for the fact that procedural justice leads
to the perception of favorable results is that workers are less likely to fear
exploitation where fair procedures are in place.276 Under those circumstances,
employees are willing to trust that their employer's decisions are in the best
interest of the collective whole; whereas absent fair process, employees are more
likely to perceive favoritism and be motivated to maximize individual interests. 77
Thus, accommodations of caregivers that stem from a formalized process may be
less likely to occasion backlash. from unencumbered workers.
Finally, there is reason to believe the mutual exposure occasioned by internal
procedures can in some instances help break down implicit bias. Social scientists
273 See Karen A. Hegtvedt et al., The Social Context of Responses to Injustice:
Considering the Indirect and Direct Effects of Group-Level Factors, 16 SOC. JUST. RES.
343, 348 (2003) (summarizing a study that found "fair treatment by group authorities
conveys to individuals that they are valued members of the group, which, in turn, increases
their self-esteem").
274 See Lonnie Golden, The Flexibility Gap: Employee Access to Flexibility in Work
Schedules, in FLEXIBILITY IN WORKPLACES: EFFECTS ON WORKERS, WORK ENVIRONMENT
AND THE UNIONS 38 (Isik Urla Zeytinoglu ed., 2005); Swanberg et al., supra note 264, at
866.
275 See Siegel et al., supra note 272, at 14 (theorizing that fair internal procedures can
lead employees to trust that organizational authorities will help them manage work-life
conflict and to respond reasonably when such conflicts cause temporary periods of
underperformance); cf Elizabeth A. Hoffman, Law in the Workplace: Dispute Resolution
in a Worker Cooperative: Formal Procedures and Procedural Justice, 39 LAW & SOC'Y
REV. 51, 73-77 (2005) (finding women preferred formal grievances systems more often
than men because women lacked access to networks necessary to accomplish informal
resolution).
276 See Hoffman, supra note 275, at 73-77.
277 See id.
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have long known that consciously held beliefs are affected by context.278 For this
reason, exposure to and interactions with persons of different backgrounds in the
workplace can affect self-reported attitudes toward that group. 279 More recent work
suggests that contextual factors can also shape unconscious attitudes, including
automatic racial and gender biases.28° Categorization experiments, for instance,
show that exposing subjects to an African-American test administrator, or to well-
known African-American personalities, will produce results evaluating blacks as a
group more positively than the results of a control group.281
A required interactive process between a manager and a non-traditional
worker could serve as the stimulus that alters implicitly held negative beliefs.
Social psychologists have theorized that stimuli presented to test subjects do not
change fixed attitudes so much as they affect the immediate construction of those
attitudes, which are built anew and in context whenever circumstances require their
retrieval.282 Fixed beliefs, under this view, are not truly fixed, but the response to
recurrent exposure to particular circumstances. This theory is consistent with the
assumption of cognitive bias that repeated associations between the work
environment and mainstream ideal workers shape employers' implicit assumptions
about who is and is not a competent, reliable worker. If so, requiring an interactive
process between management and employees in need of accommodation can
potentially make a difference in tackling the problem of unconscious bias by
offering a new situational context in which the decision maker's views about non-
traditional workers can be reformed.
278 See Jason P. Mitchell et al., Contextual Variations in Implicit Evaluation, 132 J.
EXPERIMENTAL PSYCHOL. 455, 456 (2003) (summarizing research indicating contextual
factors can systematically shift self-reported attitudes and beliefs).
279 See Adrienne Colella et al., Factors Affecting Coworkers' Procedural Justice
Inferences of the Workplace Accommodations of Employees with Disabilities, 57
PERSONNEL PSYCHOL. 1, 12 (2004) (suggesting the more exposure coworkers have had to
disabled workers, the more likely they are to assume that accommodations made by their
employer are fair); Dean B. McFarlin et al., Integrating the Disabled into the Work Force:
A Survey of Fortune 500 Company Attitudes and Practices, 4 EMP. RESPS. & RTS. J. 107,
114-16 (1991) (finding in a pre-ADA study of Fortune 500 companies that employers with
higher levels of exposure to the disabled were more likely to report positive views of
disabled workers).
280 See Jerry Kang, Trojan Horses of Race, 118 HARV. L. REv. 1489, 1505-06 (2005)
(summarizing research indicating that schemas operate automatically without conscious
intention and outside of our awareness); Mitchell et al., supra note 278, at 467.
281 See Nilanjana Dasgupta & Anthony G. Greenwald, On the Malleability of
Automatic Attitudes: Combating Automatic Prejudice with Images ofAdmired and Disliked
Individuals, 81 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 800, 800 (2001) (suggesting exposure to
pictures of admired and disliked exemplars can reduce automatic preference for white over
black Americans); Brian S. Lowery et al., Social Influence Effects on Automatic Racial
Prejudice, 81 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 842, 842 (2001) (finding that European
Americans exhibited less automatic prejudice in the presence of a black experimenter than
a white experimenter).
282 See Mitchell et al., supra note 278, at 467-68.
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C. Conclusion
Initial attention by courts to the organizational practices of employers in some
areas of discrimination law was not tied, at least initially, to broader movements in
regulatory theory or empirical research. The Supreme Court's approach to
vicarious liability in Ellerth83 and Faragher28 4 appears to have been cut from
whole cloth. Yet, as this section has demonstrated, its approach dovetails with
efforts of governance theorists to forge a friendlier approach to regulating private
entities, one that paves a middle way between free-market principles and top-down
government control. Indeed, Ellerth and Faragher heralded a wave of
discrimination scholarship that has justified these decisions on theoretical grounds
and made wider claims about the need to account for organizational actors and
internal practices in developing a second-generation approach to workplace
inequities. At the same time, actual experience, like the 2003 U.K. legislation on
requesting flexible work,285 offers reason to believe that an organizational justice
approach to regulating caregiver employment quality is not only theoretically
justified but able to work on the ground, Preliminary results from that initiative, as
well as anecdotal evidence from within the United States, demonstrate a proclivity
among some employers to voluntarily accommodate workers. And finally,
sociological research offers hope that workplace procedures can have positive
effects on employer perceptions and employee self-esteem, both of which must
occur for the goal of equal employment quality to be realized.
V. QUESTIONS AND CONCLUSIONS
This Article seeks an alternative path to redressing disparities between the
employment quality of caregivers and mainstream workers, one that relies on
procedural rights grounded in an organizational justice model of worker protection,
rather than expanded substantive rights in the tradition of equal protection and
accommodation mandates. Two pragmatic observations drive this move. First, the
inherent limitations of an inflexible rule-based regime, coupled with the lack of
political and social support for expanded substantive rights benefiting particular
groups, make it unlikely that traditional approaches to redressing disparate
employment quality will significantly erode the obstacles caregivers face at work.
Second, achieving and sustaining a more inclusive workplace cannot result from
external forces alone; success requires the support and leadership of organizations
themselves. Therefore, one goal of any transformative agenda must be an
environment of shared respect, trust, and deference between private actors,
advocates for change, and of course individual workers.
283 Burlington Indus. v. Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742 (1998).
284 Faragher v. Boca Raton, 524 U.S. 775 (1998).
285 See supra Part IV.B. 1.
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Doubtlessly, the specific proposal advanced here is only a beginning. Many
questions must be answered, and many criticisms addressed. Certainly some
thinkers will find a procedural initiative inadequate, or warn that any process-based
approach will be subverted by employers in service to their own ends. I do not
claim that a mandated interactive process of the type that I envision will help every
caregiver, nor deny that more aggressive approaches may be necessary in some
cases. But such efforts are not mutually exclusive. There is no reason to reject an
organizational justice approach to mainstreaming caregivers simply because it
cannot transform every workplace. Rather we should capitalize on what can be
accomplished through friendly regulation, while continuing the project of lobbying
for increased substantive protections, recognizing that both approaches have their
limitations and, further, that each is likely to be more effective in combination with
the other. If an organizational justice approach succeeds in creating more inclusive
cultures in some workplaces, one can expect that at least those employers may be
more tolerant of substantive measures. Similarly, where expanded substantive
rights are at stake, employers should be more willing to embrace procedures that
will enable them to find the most manageable path to compliance and potentially
reduce their risk of substantive liability.
More problematic is the risk of false compliance. If employers respond by
establishing sham procedures that either deter or superficially appease their
workers, then the current proposal may ultimately do more harm than good. While
that risk should not be diminished, it does not call for a wholesale rejection of the
organizational justice model and its potential benefits. Rather, the challenge is to
develop sound mechanisms for evaluating employer behavior that will capture and
deter bad actors as part of the broader organizational justice project. Indeed, a
critical component of the current proposal is meaningful external review, both
where procedural violations are alleged and where the burden of proof on related
substantive claims may be affected. That review must include not only an objective
assessment of employer behavior of the variety associated with the
Ellerth/Faragher defense, but also actual consideration of employers' good faith.
A fuller treatment of the meaning of that standard and courts' ability to apply it in
individual cases must await a future project, yet it should be noted that judicial
evaluation of good faith has a long history in both public and private law, and
courts have already had much success in implementing such principles in the ADA
interactive process context.
I also set aside for the moment the possibility of an organizational justice
approach that reaches beyond particular categories of workers to enhance
employee voice more generally. Surely there are non-caregivers who likewise
require workplace accommodations and have limited or no substantive rights, and
no doubt all workers desire and could benefit from greater say in employer
practices. While I thoroughly support that vision, I believe that the targeted use of
organizational justice principles to achieve a broader culture of sharing between
workers and management is a separate project, and one that will face many
challenges. Among other things, implementing the model in this way will require
creative approaches to providing incentives for employer participation given the
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absence of obvious substantive tie-ins, like the FMLA and PDA, and certainly a
thorough evaluation of the relationship of such a model to traditional labor law
would be necessary. While such matters are beyond the scope of this Article, I am
confident that successful implementation of the caregiving proposal described here
can effect cultural changes in the workplace that inure to the benefit all employees
and hope that my ideas can serve as a starting point for future discussions about
how to achieve democratic participation by all classes of employees in all places of
employment.
In conclusion, the incentivized organizational justice model advanced here
seems a logical next step in the quest for caregiver parity at work. On a theoretical
level, it avoids problematic reliance on notions of fault to capture bias and
exclusion that occur unconsciously or without animus, instead refraining the
inquiry in more relevant and less pejorative terms of employers' responsiveness to
the needs of its non-traditional workers. On a pragmatic level, an organizational
justice model avoids the pitfalls associated with equality and accommodation laws,
provides a tool for achieving flexible and site-specific solutions, and likely enjoys
wider social and political support than traditional rulemaking efforts. Finally, the
ends as well as the means of this approach is a collaborative process between
employer and employee that seeks to mainstream non-traditional workers. In this
way, the organizational justice approach advanced here identifies and targets the
"real" problem of second-generation workplace disparities-the fact that the
historical exclusion and segregation of caregivers from and within market work
has resulted in the perpetuation of workplace structures and latent stereotypes that
continue to penalize these workers. By mandating employer/caregiver interaction
and facilitating voluntary accommodation, the organizational justice approach
offers the potential for enhanced communication, revitalized managerial practices,
and true cultures of inclusion in our increasingly diverse work world.
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